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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive psychologists have recently been concerned 
not only with how people comprehend and memorize 
information, but also with the ability people have to know 
how much information they have stored in their memory, and 
what information they may be able to retrieve. The term 
metacognition refers to a person's knowledge about anything 
related to cognitive processes {Brown, 1978}. 
Metacognitive skills, for instance, enable people to 
discriminate between information they "know they know" and 
information that they do not know or are less sure of. 
The metacognitive skills of children and college 
students have been studied under many conditions, but until 
recently, few studies have concentrated on the 
metacognitive abilities of older adults. Much of the 
emphasis of research on metacognitive ability has therefore 
been concerned with how student's knowledge about what they 
do and do not know affects their efforts in learning 
material and their performance on tests, and how student 
metacognitive abilities may be improved. These may be the 
easiest and most direct applications of "knowing about 
knowing" skills. Yet as people grow older, they are 
exposed to more and more information. Therefore, it 
becomes increasingly important for them to be able to 
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discriminate between the information they know and the 
information they do not know, so that they can make 
accurate decisions in all aspects of their lives. 
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The focus of the present study is to examine one 
metacognitive skill, that of confidence judgments, in older 
adults. This study will examine whether there are any 
differences between young and older adults in this 
metacognitive skill, and whether there are differences 
between young and older adults in their reactions to 
feedback about their performance of this skill. The study 
will also examine the effects of "monetary incentive" on 
the confidence judgments of young and older adults. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Metacognitive research, in its broadest sense, 
includes any research concerned with "knowing about 
knowing ... However, a large amount of the available 
research on metacognition centers around subject 
performance on three specific metacognitive tasks: 
judgment-of-knowing tasks, feeling-of-knowing tasks, and 
confidence ratings of responses to general information 
questions. Most research on these tasks has used young 
adults and children as subjects. However, recent interest 
in the psychology of aging has led several researchers to 
include older adult subjects in these metacognitive 
studies. 
The following review is organized from a developmental 
perspective of subject performance, from childhood to old 
age, in each of these three metacognitive tasks. Although 
all three tasks are concerned with aspects of metacognitive 
ability, the research studies employing these tasks differ 
in the methodology that they use. Therefore, a brief 
review of the methodology of each task will be presented 
first. This will be followed by a review of the research 
studies that use these tasks to study metacognitive 
abilities for three age groups: children, young adults, and 
older adults. 
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Review of Research Methodology: Judgment-of-Knowing 
Predictions 
4 
Judgment-of-knowing prediction tasks test 
metacognitive abilities by asking subjects to make 
judgments about the likelihood that they will be able to 
remember information they are presently studying 
(e.g.Gardiner & Klee, 1976). For example, subjects may be 
given a list of words to study, and asked during study to 
predict how likely they think it is that they will recall 
each word. Later they are given a recall test on the list, 
and their actual performance compared to their predicted 
performance. 
Feeling-of-Knowing Predictions 
If everyone had a perfect memory, then people would be 
able to retrieve any information that they had stored in 
their memory, and the only information that they would not 
be able to retrieve would be information that they had 
never encoded. In reality, people often fail to recall 
information that they actually do have stored in their 
memory. They may 11 feel that they know" the information, 
that it is on the "tip-of-their-tongue", and yet be 
temporarily unable to recall it. This Tip-of-the-Tongue 
(TOT) phenomenon, first mentioned by William James (1893), 
is a "feeling-of-knowing" occurrence, and has been 
explored by several researchers. Naturally occurring TOT 
states were first studied by Woodworth (1934) for English 
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words, and Wencl (1934) for German words. They found that 
when complete recall of a word is not present, people can 
often recall part of the word, such as a letter or syllable 
from the word, or something abstract about the word, such 
as how many syllables it has. Brown and McNeill (1966) 
also noted that subjects in a TOT state had knowledge of 
certain letters in the word, and also knew where the 
primary stress in the word was found. Yarmey (1973) 
explored verbal and non-verbal imagery codes involved in 
the TOT phenomenon by presenting subjects with pictures of 
famous people and asking them to try to recall their names. 
His TOT state subjects also used knowledge about the 
letters and syllables in the famous person's name for 
retrieval, and in addition to this information they relied 
on information about the target person's profession, or the 
last time that they had seen the target. 
The TOT phenomenon is related to the "feeling-of-
knowing" paradigm introduced by Hart (1965, 1967). Hart's 
hypothesis was that people may be more likely to recognize 
information that they feel that they know but can't recall, 
than information for which they have no "feeling-of-
knowing". The method that Hart used to study "feeling-of-
knowing" skills was to first ask subjects to recall general 
information items, and then, for those items not recalled, 
to judge whether an answer would be recognized if it was 
presented among several alternatives. After these feeling-
of-knowing predictions, subjects were given a multiple-
choice test in order to evaluate their actual recognition 
of these items. 
Confidence Judgements 
6 
A third task used to assess metacognitive abilities is 
to ask subjects to make a judgment about how confident they 
are that an answer they have given to a question is 
correct. These confidence judgments are usually made by 
asking subjects to estimate the probability that each of 
their answers is correct. A "calibration" measure of how 
accurately subjects have made their confidence judgments 
(how well "calibrated" they are) is achieved by having 
subjects answer a series of questions, and give a 
confidence rating (in the form of a probability) for each. 
This rating reflects how confident they are that their 
answer is correct. A comparison is then made between the 
number of items receiving any given rating, and the actual 
proportion correct for items at that rating. For example, 
if subjects gave a series of their answers a .80 confidence 
rating, stating that they are 80% sure that these answers 
are correct, then to be well-calibrated, they should 
actually get an average of 80% of these answers corre.ct. 
An examination of research employing these tasks, with 
subjects from different age groups, follows. Many of these 
studies indicate "developmental trends" in these 
metacognitive tasks, with older children and young adults 
displaying better metacognitive skills than younger 
children. 
Developmental Studies In Metacognition 
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Flavell (1971) has termed knowledge that people have 
about their own memory "metamemory". This term has often 
been used interchangeably with "metacognition'', especially 
in developmentally based studies. Wellman (1977) has 
pointed out that a distinction can be made betweeen two 
types of metamemory: (1) Timeless facts that people could 
know about memory (i.e. short lists are easier to learn 
than long lists; young children are usually worse at 
memorizing lists than adults, etc.); (2) Ongoing 
assessments people could make about information in their 
own memory (i.e. this information is in my memory: this 
information is definitely not there, etc.). The 
developmental studies that follow are concerned with this 
second type of metacognition, exploring assessments that 
subjects can make about information in their own memories. 
Childhood 
Several studies using metacognitive tasks have 
compared the performance of young, school age children to 
that of older children or college students. Some of these 
studies have shown that even very young children can 
accurately discriminate between items they have missed and 
items they have identified correctly on previous testing. 
8 
For instance, Masur, Mcintyre and Flavell (1973) tested the 
ability of first graders to judge which items they had 
recalled correctly and which items they had missed on a 
recall test. The children showed high identification 
accuracy: 98% of their identifications were correct for 
recalled items and 96% were correct for nonrecalled items. 
Berch and Evans (1973) presented kindergarten and 
third grade subjects with a list of items. After the items 
were presented once, the children were given a second list 
of items, and asked to judge whether any of the items had 
been viewed on the first list. The children were also 
asked to make judgments about how sure they were that their 
identifications were correct. Their results showed that 
the probability of recognizing an item, for both age groups 
of children, varied directly as a function of their 
certainty judgments. This indicates that children of both 
ages were capable of monitoring the certainty of their 
recognition. 
Other studies indicate that although children do show 
metamemory skills very early, there are some developmental 
trends in metacognitive accuracy. Flavell, Friedrichs and 
Hoyt (1970) instructed children to study a set of stimuli 
until they could recall all the items. It was emphasized 
that the children were not to signal for a recall test 
until they were sure that they could achieve perfect 
9 
recall. Second and fourth graders were relatively accurate 
on this task of item recallability, but nursery school and 
kindergarten students frequently called for the recall test 
before they were able to correctly recall all the items. 
Kreutzer, Leonard and Flavell (1975) asked children in 
grades K,l,3, and 5 to make ease of learning judgments for 
lists of paired words that were 11 0pposites 11 versus lists of 
paired words of people and things they may do. The 
opposites list was shown to be easier to learn by all the 
children. However, older children were more likely than 
younger children to be able to identify that they would 
have an easier time learning the lists of opposites than 
the list of people-things they do. Even when younger 
children chose the opposites list as easier to learn, they 
were often not able to explain why it was easier. The young 
children did, however, show some knowledge of the 
relationship between being familiar with a list of items 
and the ease with which the items could be learned. 
Young children appear to have some trouble not only in 
discriminating how easy lists of items will be to learn, 
but also, for prose passages, in discriminating which items 
will be important to learn in order to remember the main 
ideas of the prose passage, and which items would be less 
important to spend time studying (Brown & Smiley ,1977). 
Similiar differences in these types of discrimination 
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abilities have been found in comparing academically 
successful elementary students, who can make these 
discriminations accurately, with less successful students, 
who have trouble making these discriminations (Smiley, 
Oakly, Worthen, Campione, & Brown, 1977: OWings, Petersen, 
Bransford, Morris, & Stein, 1980). 
Wellman (1977) designed a study using Hart's(l965) 
feeling-of-knowing paradigm. He asked kindergarten, first 
and third grade children to recall the name of items 
depicted in pictures. When the children failed to recall 
any name, they were asked to give a feeling-of-knowing 
judgment about their ability to recognize the name if it 
was presented to them. They were also asked to judge 
whether or not they had ever seen the depicted item before. 
They were given a recognition test for all those items they 
had been unable to recall. There was a significant 
increase with age in the subjects' ability to predict which 
items they would and would not be able to recognize. 
Kindergartners were only somewhat better than chance in 
their predictions, whereas third graders were fairly 
accurate in their recognition predictions. All subjects 
were able to predict whether or not they had seen an item 
before, but the kindergartners seemed to ignore their 
"seen" judgments when making their feeling-of-knowing 
predictions. 
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Although even very young children seem to have some 
metacognitive abilities, it is clear that these abilities 
improve as children grow older. Wertsch (1979) has 
proposed a theory of how metacognitive abilities originate 
and develop in preschoolers based on social interaction. 
His theory states that the crucial element in metacognitive 
development is adult-child interaction in a problem-
solving setting (Wertsch, 1979: Wertsch, McNamee, McLane & 
Budwig, 1980). Kontos (1983) tested this hypothesis by 
observing the performance of pre-school children during a 
problem-solving task. The preschoolers, ages 3-5, were 
asked to solve three peg-puzzles that required putting pegs 
in holes. Each child was given a 5 minute interval to 
attempt to solve the puzzle, and after each puzzle session, 
children were asked to explain how they had tried to solve 
the puzzle (to ascertain any 11 metacognitive strategy .. they 
had used). During the second puzzle solving session, an 
adult, either the preschooler's mother or father, was 
allowed to be present during the session to help her or his 
son or daughter solve the puzzle by giving verbal strategy 
clues. 
A third puzzle solving session, with the preschoolers 
working alone again, followed the second session. Changes 
in the preschoolers' metacognitive abilities were assessed 
by comparing their performance and strategy use on puzzle 1 
12 
to that on puzzle 3. Kontos found that children who had 
not received help from their parents during the puzzle 2 
session improved just as much in performance and knowledge 
of strategy use as children who received many verbal 
directives from their parents. It was concluded that 
practice may be just as important in the development of 
metacognitive ability in children as adult-child 
interactions. The study also indicates that children may 
be able to increase their metacognitive abilities through 
training and practice. 
A review of metacognitive studies employing children 
as subjects indicates that, although even young children 
(i.e., kindergarten age) show some metacognitive abilities, 
these abilities seem to improve with age. This is 
especially true for more complicated tasks, such as judging 
the amount of study time needed to learn a list of 
information, or making feeling-of-knowing judgments about 
information that cannot be recalled. 
Young Adulthood 
Most metacognitive studies have employed young 
college-age adults (usually 18-22 years of age) as 
subjects. Since the major emphasis in a college student's 
life is on how to study effectively, many metacognitive 
studies with young adults have used judgment-of-knowing 
tasks. 
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For example, Groninger (1979) presented subjects with 
a list of 60 words and asked them to rate, as they heard 
each word, their confidence that they would later be able 
to recall that word. They were then tested for recall, 
and, after the recall test, given a surprise recognition 
memory test. In the recognition task the subjects heard 
the target words interspersed with distractor words. Their 
task was to rate how sure they were that each word was a 
target word. Subjects' actual recall and recognition 
scores related to thei~prediction ratings, although they 
considerably overestimated their performance abilities. A 
second part of the study found that accurate recall 
predictions were also significantly related to word 
frequency and imagery variables. 
In addition to predictions of what will be recalled, 
judgment-of-knowing tasks include studies examining the 
ability of people to discriminate what they have and have 
not been able to recall on previous study-test trials. 
These studies examine the relationship between knowledge of 
previous test-trial performance and a subject's performance 
on later study trials. 
One of the studies examining this relationship is by 
Gardiner and Klee (1976). They gave college students a 
series of free-recall lists, each of which they studied and 
attempted to recall on a recall test. Following the recall 
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test on the last list, the subjects were given the words 
from all the lists, and were asked to identify which words 
they had recalled on the initial tests. Even though this 
final test was unexpected, subjects were generally accurate 
in being able to distinguish previously recalled and non-
recalled items. 
A study by King, Zechrneister, and Shaughnessy (1980) 
also underlined the importance of previous test trials for 
accurate judgment of knowing ratings. They gave subjects 
several exposures to pairs-of-items from two lists, and 
then asked them to predict for each pair the likelihood 
that the response term would be recalled when the stimulus 
term was presented on subsequent trials. Half of the 
subjects received only study trials prior to the prediction 
task. The other half of the subjects received alternating 
study and test trials. All the subjects were also required 
to learn a third paired-associate list and make judgments 
of knowing without receiving any test trials. The results 
showed that prediction accuracy was consistently higher for 
those subjects who had been given test trials prior to the 
prediction task. Also, those subjects who had been given 
test trials on the first two lists showed a decrease in 
prediction accuracy on the third list for which they did 
not receive test trials. 
One theory explaining the increase in judgment of 
knowing accuracy with the use of test trials has been 
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suggested by Bisanz, Vesonder, and Voss (1978). Their 
hypothesis states that learners make decisions regarding 
memory processing based on their discimination between 
known and not yet known items. Accurate discriminaton 
between information a learner already knows, and 
information that he or she needs to spend more time 
studying, would enable the learner to shift processing from 
well-learned items to processing less well-learned items, 
thus letting the learner distribute study time efficiently. 
Other theories have been suggested to explain 
discrimination of known and unknown information in the 
absence of test trials. Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) have 
proposed that subjects make these judgments of knowing on 
the basis of perceived item difficulty, since they found 
ease of learning (EL) ratings to correlate highly with JK 
responses made during study. 
Zechmeister, Christensen, and Rajkowski (1980) 
examined the relationship between EL ratings and JK ratings 
by presenting two groups of students with a list of facts. 
One group of subjects was asked to rate each sentence in 
terms of how easy or hard it would be for someone in 
general to remember, while the other group rated items in 
terms of how easy or hard each item would be for themselves 
to remember. On every trial a fact was presented followed 
by study, a judgment-of-knowing rating, and then, after a 
filler task, recall was tested. Although JK ratings were 
found to be better predictors of item difficulty than EL 
ratings, EL ratings did reliably predict item difficulty. 
Zechmeister et al. also found evidence to suggest that 
there was a difference in the JK performance between good 
and poor learners in that good learners were, in one 
condition, more accurate in "knowing what they know". 
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Judgment-of-knowing predictions, then, have been shown 
to be quite accurate after only study trials are used. 
However, the method used to present items to a subject can 
affect JK predictions. When memory for a lengthy list of 
verbal items is tested, items that have been repeated 
within the list in a distributed manner {DP) are more 
likely to be remembered than are items repeated in a massed 
fashion {MP) {Hintzman, 1974). Subjects spend less time 
studying massed presentations of an item than studying 
distributed presentations when study is self-paced 
{Shaughnessy, Zimmerman & Underwood, 1972). Zechmeister 
and Shaughnesy {1980) found that in a judgment of knowing 
task, MP items were consistently judged to be more 
recallable than the DP items, even though recall was 
actually higher for DP items. Learners were, however, 
accurately able to predict that twice-presented items would 
be easier to recall than once-presented items. 
A summary of judgment-of-knowing predictions for young 
adults indicates that their predictions about what 
information they will and will not be able to recognize and 
17 
recall after study are related to their actual performance. 
However, young adult subjects do show some overconfidence 
in their judgments, predicting that they will recognize or 
recall more items than they are able to, and erroneously 
judging that MP items will be more recallable than DP 
items. 
The feeling-of-knowing (FK) task has also been used to 
study the metacognitive abilities of young adults. As 
stated earlier, Hart was the first researcher to use the 
feeling-of-knowing paradigm. In Hart's first experiments 
(1965), subjects were asked to attempt recall of general 
information items, and, then, for those items not recalled, 
to judge whether an answer would be recognized if it was 
presented among several alternatives. Following these 
recall and judgment phases, a multiple-choice recognition 
' 
test was given. The basic test of the accuracy of the FK 
responses (feeling-of-knowing items that recognition is 
predicted for) and FK responses (those the subject predicts 
they probably will not recall) is made by looking only at 
the test items that subjects predicted they had missed, and 
in actuality had missed, on the test of recall. If the 
feeling-of-knowing judgments are accurate indicators of 
memory storage, the proportion correct recognition for FK 
items should be significantly greater than the proportion 
correct for FK items. Hart's results showed that FK 
predictions are accurate indicators of memory storage. 
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Memory performance on FK items was correct 67% of the time, 
whereas performance on FK items proved correct only about 
40% of the time, although this also shows that subjects 
were overconfident in their feeling-of-knowing judgments. 
Hart emphasizes that overcautious withholding of 
correct answers can falsely inflate a subject's memory-
monitoring accuracy by producing correct recognition 
responses that should have been eliminated from the scoring 
as correct recall responses. Therefore, it is important to 
encourage subjects to guess. Hart has shown memory 
monitoring accuracy to occur in college students for 
general information questions {1965) as well as for paired 
associate materials {1967) and results are the same whether 
simple FK or FK dichotomous ratings or 6 pt. rating scales 
for feeling-of-knowing judgments are used. 
Blake {1973) points out that even though subjects in 
Hart's experiments {1965,1967) recognized more items given 
FK ratings than FK ratings, subjects showed overconfidence 
in some of their judgments by failing to recognize about 
44% of the items they felt they knew. They also recognized 
42% of the items they felt they did not know. He suggested 
that one of the problems in Hart's procedure is that there 
were substantial time lapses between attempted recall of a 
given item, FK judgments, and recognition of items. This 
could possibly reduce the predictive power of the FK 
judgments. Blake used trigram stimuli presented so that 
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all three phases, test, recall, and recognition, could be 
obtained on each item before presentation of the next item. 
His results indicated that a reduction in the time between 
item recall, FK judgments and item recognition can increase 
FK rating accuracy. 
Freedman and Landauer (1966) investigated both the TOT 
and FK phenomena, replicating the results of previous 
findings. Their subjects were also able to accurately 
predict which items missed on the recall test would be 
accurately identified on the recognition test. They also 
found, similar to the tip-of-the-tongue studies, that 
providing subjects with the initial letter of the correct 
answer on the recognition test significantly increased 
recognition of the answer. 
The FK and related metacognitive tasks, then, indicate 
that young adults are fairly accurate at knowing whether or 
not they will be able to recognize information that they 
cannot, in some given time period, recall, but that there 
is a tendency for people to be overconfident in their 
judgments. 
Metacognitive studies of college-aged students have 
also included research on the confidence judgments (CJ) 
that young adults ascribe to the accuracy of their answers 
to general information questions. Murdock (1966) assessed 
subject confidence judgments by presenting subjects with 
lists, each composed of five paired associate words. After 
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the presentation of each list, a probe was given for one of 
the pairs, and subjects were asked to recall the word 
associated with the probe and give a rating of how 
confident they were that their answer was correct. They 
used a 6-point scale ranging from a point indicating that 
they were positive that their response was correct to a 
point indicating that they were positive that their 
response was incorrect. Murdock found that subjects could 
assess their performance quite accurately. When they gave 
the highest rating they were nearly always correct, and 
when they gave the lowest judgment they were nearly always 
wrong. 
A group of researchers at a Decision Research Center 
in Oregon has focused many of their research studies on 
examining how subjects are calibrated. The basic design of 
their research is to give subjects general information 
questions, and have them respond to each question by 
choosing the most likely answer from two alternatives 
provided. They are then asked to indicate their degree of 
certainty that the answer they have selected is correct. 
These studies have found that college students tend to be 
overconfident in their confidence ratings to general 
information questions (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) as well as in their 
responses to more practical information questions, such as 
which diseases or accidents are more likely to be fatal 
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(Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
Some confidence judgment studies have reported that 
people who know more are better calibrated. Nickerson and 
McGoldrick (1963,1965) and Pitz (1974) have reported that 
people who know more about the materials they are being 
tested on are more accurate in their confidence ratings, 
and Maki and Berry (1984) found that high achieving 
students were better able to accurately predict their 
future test performance than were lower achieving students. 
Shaughnessy (1979) has reported a positive relationship 
between confidence judgment accuracy and test performance. 
Lichtenstein et al. (1977) in an in-depth study, 
examined the relationship between knowledge and accurate 
calibration. Using general information, two-alternative 
choice questions, they found that, if percent of items 
answered correctly is held constant between subjects, there 
is no evidence that expertise in a particular area leads to 
better calibration. When subjects were not matched for 
percent of items answered correctly, subjects who knew more 
clearly outperformed those who knew nothing. The latter 
situation tended to lead to high levels of overconfidence, 
poor calibration and little accurate discrimination 
between use of numbers on the probability scale. With 
increasing knowledge carne decreasing overconfidence until, 
for those whose percentage correct exceeded 80%, there was 
moderate underconfidence. This study indicates the 
importance of matching subjects for percent of items 
correct, before assessing their confidence ratings. 
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It has already been cited that the major finding from 
the Decision Research Center is that college-aged subjects 
are overconfident in evaluating the accuracy of their 
knowledge. Fischhoff et al. (1977) found that subjects 
were so confident in the confidence judgments they had made 
that many were willing to stake money on the accuracy of 
their judgments. The overconfidence of all of these 
subjects willing to gamble was so great that all would have 
actually lost money if the gamble had been real. 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) 
hypothesized that overconfidence is due to relying more on 
reasons consistent with a chosen answer than on 
considerations contradicting it. To test this hypothesis, 
they first had each of their subjects choose the correct 
alternative for a series of general information questions, 
and then had them judge the probability that their choice 
was correct. They used two conditions for this task: one 
where subjects were not required to give reasons for their 
choices, and another where subjects were required to 
specify all possible reasons that they could give for 
favoring and opposing each choice. They found that the 
calibration scores for the subjects under the reasons 
condition were superior to those under the control 
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condition. In a second experiment they found that a group 
listing only contradictory reasons also improved 
significantly in calibration. These results strongly 
suggest that confidence in an answer depends on the reasons 
a subject can provide to support or contradict the answer. 
Several recent studies have addressed the possibility 
of training realistic confidence. Lichtenstein and 
Fischhoff (1980) have reported that people can improve 
their confidence accuracy if comprehensive feedback on 
their performance is provided. They gave subjects feedback 
on the accuracy of their confidence ratings over multiple 
training sessions. They found that feedback did lead to 
improved calibration, but that almost all of the 
improvement in the quality of subject ratings took place 
after the first feedback session. 
Zechmeister, Rusch, and Markell (1986) also found that 
confidence judgment accuracy improved for subjects who were 
provided with feedback, although they found that training 
had more of an effect on improving the calibration scores 
of subjects defined as low achievers than on those 
designated as high achievers. Arkes, Lai, and Hackett 
(1982) have shown that simply informing subjects that they 
will have to explain why they have chosen each of their 
answers to a group of fellow subjects reduces subject 
overconfidence, even in the absence of training sessions or 
the requirements to list contradictory reasons. 
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In general, confidence judgment studies indicate that 
young adults tend to be overconfident in evaluating the 
accuracy of their knowledge of general information. 
However, subjects are better 11 calibrated" if they are asked 
to give support for and, more importantly, against their 
answers before they assign a confidence rating to their 
response. Training sessions, giving subjects feedback 
about their confidence ratings, have also been shown to 
improve the confidence judgment accuracy of young adults. 
Older Adults 
The metacognitive abilities of older adults have been 
ignored until recently. Research has shown that 
metacognitive abilities indicate a developmental trend, 
with older children and young adults showing more accurate 
metacognitive skills than younger children (Kreutzer, 
Leonard, & Flavell, 1975}. Research on the metacognitive 
abilities of older adults explores the idea that the 
development of metacognitive abilities may extend 
throughout adulthood, and the possibility that older adults 
may show metacognitive skills that are different from those 
of younger adults. 
A study by Lachman, Lachman, and Thronesbury (1979) 
assessed this possibility by examining the metamemory 
abilities of young, middle-aged, and older adults. They 
employed feeling-of-knowing tasks dealing both with 
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questions of accuracy (are items predicted to be known 
actually known) and efficiency (do people spend more time 
searching for an answer they believe they know than one 
they don't know). The task was similar to Hart's {1965) 
study using general information questions. No age group 
showed better metamemorial accuracy or efficiency than any 
other. All of the age groups answered more items correctly 
that they thought they knew and fewer items they thought 
they did not know, although all groups showed some 
overconfidence in their judgments. All subjects spent more 
time responding to items they thought they knew and less 
time responding to items they thought they did not know. 
It did appear, however, that relative to the other groups, 
the oldest group may have suppressed some correct answers 
and included them in the most confident feeling-of-knowing 
category. This possibility may make the feeling-of-knowing 
ratings for the oldest group misleading, since it was 
previously mentioned by Hart ·(1965) that cautiousness of 
responding can lead to inflated estimates of feeling-of-
knowing accuracy. The oldest group may not have had 
feeling-of-knowing ratings that were as accurate as the 
other age groups if they had not suppressed some of their 
correct answers. 
Perlmutter (1978) has assessed the memory monitoring 
skills of older and younger subjects' at two education 
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levels: high school and doctoral. She tested subjects' 
memory prediction judgments, feeling-of-knowing judgments 
and confidence judgments for words and facts. The word 
tasks involved having subjects study 24 words under 
incidental and intentional conditions. They were then 
asked to predict how many words they felt they would be 
able to recall, and were then given a recall test. After 
the test, they were asked to rate, for the words they had 
recalled, how confident they were, on a 4 point scale, that 
each word they had recalled was on the originally presented 
list. They were also asked to predict how many of the 
words they had not been able to recall they felt they would 
be able to recognize. For the fact portion of the study, 
24 general information fact questions were presented and 
subjects were instructed to answer the questions, make 
confidence ratings for as many of the questions as they 
could recall, and for those they could not recall, predict 
how many they would be able to recognize. No age 
differences in accuracy of confidence ratings, or 
recognition predictions were found, although more education 
at any age was associated with more accurate memory 
monitoring skills. Perlmutter suggests that lack of age 
differences in metacognitive abilities may indicate that 
these abilities do not contribute to age differences in 
adult memory. 
Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, and Schmitt's {1980) 
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two-part study examined judgment of knowing skills of older 
adults. The first part of the study examined two JK tasks. 
All subjects were first asked to estimate their memory span 
for a series of line drawings, and then each subject was 
given a span test to assess their estimation accuracy. 
After this task was completed, subjects were instructed to 
study each of three different lengths of line drawing 
lists (with the length of each based on variations of their 
previous memory span accuracy). They were told to spend as 
much time as they felt was necessary to accurately recall 
each of the lists. The results for the estimation task 
showed that young and older adults were equally accurate in 
their memory span estimation, although older subjects 
memory span performance was considerably less than that of 
the younger adults. The older adults performed more poorly 
than the younger adults in the recall readiness task in 
that they chose to study less time in response to 
increasing task difficulty than did the younger subjects. 
In a second part of the study it was shown that differences 
in recall readiness accuracy between the age groups could 
be eliminated if older subjects were forced to spend at 
least a set minimal amount of time studying the lists. 
Differences between the metacognitive abilities of 
young and older adults may not always reflect "age" 
differences. Like Perlmutter (1978), Zivian and Darjes 
(1983) have suggested that since school provides students 
• 
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with opportunities to practice a variety of mnemonic 
strategies, and to evaluate their abilities to memorize, it 
may have a positive effect on judgment-of-knowing tasks. 
They compared four groups of female subjects on memory 
performance for a list of 30 words, and on metacognitive 
strategies used to learn the list. The four groups 
consisted of young college students, middle-aged college 
students, and middle-aged and older (over 65) women who had 
not attended college in the last 5 years. Subjects in 
school performed better on the memory recall test, and 
reported using more mnemonic strategies to learn the word 
list, than did subjects not in school. However, there were 
no significant differences between the young and middle-
aged subjects in school, or the middle-aged and older 
subjects out of school. Zivian and Darjes concluded that 
being in school may be a better predictor of metacognitive 
and memory performance than age differences. 
These developmental studies examining metacognitive 
skills indicate that, although there are developmental 
trends .showing older children to be more accurate in these 
skills than younger children, accuracy in metacognitive 
judgments for some tasks can be seen in children as early 
as kindergarten. Young adults are fairly accurate in 
assessing their metacognitive skills, although they are 
often "overconfident" in their assessments. And of the few 
studies examining metacognitive ability in old age, only 
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one study (Nurphy et al. 1980) showed older subjects to be 
less accurate at making these judgments, with the other two 
studies showing no age decrements between young and older 
adults. No calibration curves on the metacognitive 
abilities of older adults have yet been obtained. 
Age Differences in Cautiousness and Risk-Taking 
Studies on age differences in cautiousness and risk-
taking may help lead to predictions about age differences 
in confidence judgment tasks, since "well-calibrated" 
people could be seen as being "more cautious" in their 
confidence judgments than a person who is overconfident in 
using confidence judgment ratings. 
Several studies examining age differences in risk-
taking responses have used a "choice-dilemma questionnaire" 
originally developed by Kogan and Wallach (1961). The 
questionnaire is made up of a series of everyday life 
situations. The central person in each situation is forced 
with a choice between two courses of action, one which is 
more risky than the other, but also more rewarding if the 
outcome is successful. The subject must indicate the 
probability of success that he or she feels would be 
sufficient to warrant the risky choice. They select from 
six probability of success alternatives presented after 
each situation is given: 1, 3, 5, 7 or 9 chances out of 10 
that the risky alternative will be a success, and an 
alternative not to choose the risky course no matter what 
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the probability of success. Many studies employing this 
task to test age differences in risk-taking have found 
older adults to respond cautiously, choosing higher 
probabilities of success than younger adults before they 
feel it would be desirable for the person described in the 
dilemma to take the more risky course of action (Botwinick, 
' 
1966,1969: Kagan & Wallach, 1961: Vroom & Pahl, 1971). 
Botwinick (1969) found that the main reason for this age 
difference in responding was the fact that elderly subjects 
were more likely to choose the "no-choice of risky 
alternative no matter what the probability of success" 
option than were younger adults. When this option was 
unavailable, Botwinick (1969) found that elderly and 
younger subjects were similar in their risk-taking 
responses. 
More recent studies have examined risk-taking in the 
elderly in terms of task performance under different 
conditions of reinforcement. Reinforcement has either been 
studied in terms of instructional set, where subjects 
receive instructions reinforcing or discouraging risk-
taking responses (Okun & Di Vesta, 1976), or monetary 
incentive, where subjects are reinforced with money for 
risk-taking behavior (Birkhill & Schaie, 1975: Okun & 
Cherin, 1977: Robins, 1969: and Winefeld & Hullins, 1980). 
All of these studies on the relationship of 
reinforcement to risk-taking support Botwinick's (1969) 
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finding that when a risk-taking option is not available, or 
in the case of reinforcement, made somehow undesirable, 
older subjects and younger subjects will show similar risk-
taking responses. The elderly will, however, tend to 
choose to take fewer risks, or not to respond at all, when 
given the option. This often results in increased omission 
errors in the elderly, and more cautious responding. 
These cautiousness studies indicate that older 
subjects are more likely to choose the most extreme and 
cautious response, that of taking no risks, than are 
younger subjects, when that response is available. 
However, when older subjects are forced to use a scale 
without a "no risk" option, they are similar to younger 
subjects in their risk-taking responses. This implies that 
the type of scale used to make risk-taking ratings may 
affect older subject responses more than it affects the 
responses of younger subjects. 
RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present experiment will examine the effect of 
three variables on confidence ratings. The first variable 
is age. No confidence rating studies have examined 
calibration differences between young and older adults. 
Most of the studies looking at age differences in 
metacognitive tasks have not found older subjects to be 
significantly different from young subjects in their 
metacognitive skills. However, Lachman et al. (1979) 
indicated that the older adults in their study may have 
been more cautious than the younger subjects in the recall 
phase of the experiment, being less likely than the younger 
subjects to say that they recalled an answer that they were 
not positive about. This could lead to an "inflated" 
feeling-of-knowing performance for older adults, since they 
may have been more likely than younger adults to make a 
"feeling-of-knowing" rating on items that they could 
actually recall. Older subjects in the Lachman et al. 
(1979) study did show feeling-of-knowing ratings that were 
similar to those of the younger subjects; however, if their 
performance was artificially "inflated" due to cautious 
responding, they may actually be less accurate than young 
adults in their feeling-of-knowing assessments. Murphy et 
al. (1980) suggested that older subjects may have more 
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problems than younger subjects in making judgment-of- 33 
knowing assessments. Thus, older subjects may have more 
problems than younger subjects in making confidence 
ratings, perhaps showing 11 poorer calibration ... 
However, the Lachman et al. (1979} study indicates 
that older subjects may show more .. cautiousness" in 
responding than younger subjects, and research on 
cautiousness indicate that older subjects will respond more 
cautiously (Botwinick, 1966), and will show more omission 
errors than young subjects, in some 11 risk-taking 11 tasks, 
when given the chance. This might lead to a prediction 
that older subjects will be less overconfident than younger 
subjects, perhaps showing "better calibration". 
In the present study, subjects did not have the choice 
of "not responding". All subjects were required to respond 
to a series of general information questions, and to rate 
their confidence that their response is correct. However, 
all subjects were able to choose a "cautious" rating that 
indicated that they had no idea whether or not their 
response was correct. 
The second variable to be examined is monetary 
incentive. Past studies have all employed number scales 
for subjects to use to make their confidence judgment 
ratings. The present study will provide half of the 
subjects with a "money incentive" scale, where they will 
"bet money" to make their ratings, and half of the subjects 
will be provided with the usual "number" scale (no money 34 
incentive) to make their ratings. The prediction is that 
subjects may be more accurate in their confidence ratings 
if they think they can win money by being accurate, than if 
they have no money incentive to be accurate. 
The third variable studied is the effect of feedback 
on confidence ratings. Past studies have indicated that 
training subjects by providing them with information about 
their confidence judgment performances can help them to 
improve their confidence judgment accuracy on future tests 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1980). The present study asked 
subjects to go through the same set of general information 
questions twice, assigning confidence ratings to their 
responses both times. In between trials, subjects were 
given brief feedback that they may have been overconfident 
on their ratings during the first trial, and encouraged to 
try to make accurate ratings on the second trial. The 
hypothesis is that subjects will be less overconfident in 
their ratings on Trial 2 than they were on Trial 1, even 
though the feedback was be brief, and not directed to any 
specific Trial 1 responses. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
A total of 34 college students, (X age= 19.38 yrs.) 
from Loyola University in Chicago and the College of St. 
Thomas in St. Paul volunteered to participate in the study. 
These students received credit towards their grade in 
Introduction to Psychology classes in exchange for their 
participation. A total of 28 older adults, (X age= 71.61 
yrs.),from the Roger's Park area in Chicago were also 
recruited, with the majority located through senior citizen 
centers. All older subjects were offered $1 to participate 
in the study. 
One half of the subjects at each age level were 
randomly assigned to the "Questions-only Condition"(No 
Money Reinforcement). All subjects who had been assigned 
to this condition were asked to give true/false responses 
to each of 100 general information statements, and to rate 
each of these responses in terms of their confidence that 
it was correct. The other half of the subjects were 
randomly assigned to the "Monetary Incentive 
condition"(Money Reinforcement}. Subjects assigned to this 
condition were asked to give true/false responses to each 
of 100 general information statements: however they were 
asked to predict how certain they were that each response 
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was correct by stating the number of pennies they would be 
willing to bet that their response was correct, from 0 to 5 
cents. It was explained to them that they could win money 
if they were accurate in rating the confidence of their 
responses in this way (see Appendix C). 
Materials 
The subjects were given a packet of 100 4x6 in. index 
cards, each card containing one general information 
statement (see Appendix A). They were also given an answer 
sheet for their responses and ratings (see Appendix B). 
Most of the general information questions used were taken 
from a study by Nelson and Narens (1980) giving norms for 
300 general-information questions. Pilot studies were done 
to design the present series of questions so that, on the 
average, subjects from both age groups would be able to 
answer approximately half of the questions accurately 
(corrected for chance guessing). 
Procedure 
At the beginning of each session, subjects in both 
groups were given Form 1 of the Quick Vocabulary test. The 
Quick Test is a brief individual intelligence test based on 
perceptual-verbal performance. Form 1 consists of four 
line drawings, and subjects are asked to point to which of 
the line drawings best represents each of the 50 word-
items. Three to ten minutes are required to administer the 
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QT to any person who can see the drawings and hear or read 
the word items. Scores on the test were calculated 
immediately after it was delivered, and subjects were 
required to score 43 or above (approximately equivalent to 
100 on a standardized I.Q. test) in order to receive the 
100 general information question cards. The young 
subjects' X QT score was 44.74: for older subjects the X QT 
score= 46.75. ·The subjects were told that they were being 
given a vocabulary test. If they asked for further 
information, they were told that it was to help the 
experimenter decide on which packet of questions to use. 
All subjects were told that they had done well on the 
vocabulary test, and then the rest of the procedure was 
explained to them. 
All subjects were told that this was a two-part study, 
each part taking approximately 30 min •• The subjects were 
then given instructions relaying information about the 
condition to which they had been assigned. (See Appendix C 
for specific instructions). All subjects were told to 
respond true or false to each of the 100 statements on the 
answer sheet provided, and to rate their confidence that 
each of their responses Wqs correct on the six-point scale 
provided for each response. Subjects were told to take as 
much time as they needed to make their responses and 
ratings. 
The experimenter stayed in the room with all the 
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subjects in order to answer any questions they might have. 
The experimenter read the questions to any of the older 
subjects who requested this assistance. Approximately 1/4 
of the subjects requested this assistance. After the 
subjects had responded to and rated the responses to all 
100 questions, the subjects were given a 5 to 10 minute 
break. During this time the experimenter corrected each 
subjects' answer sheet, and computed the number of points 
or pennies a subject had given as a confidence rating to 
each incorrect decision they had made. 
During the second part of the study, the subjects were 
asked to do the same task again, using the same cards in 
the same order. They were then (a) given feedback about 
how many points or pennies they had placed on their 
incorrect decision while going through the task the first 
time, (b) urged to approach the questions as though they 
were answering them for the first time, and (c) told to try 
to be as accurate as they could be in their confidence 
ratings (See Appendix C for detailed instructions for both 
conflitions). 
RESULTS 
Many measures have been used in metacognitive studies 
to evaluate confidence judgment performance. Assessments 
of over-confidence are most often evaluated by using 
calibration curves. The measures reported here include 
calibration curves, along with numerical assessments of 
over/underconfidence, calibration and resolution introduced 
by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), and confidence 
accuracy quotients, introduced by Zimmerman, Broder, 
Shaughnessy and Underwood (1977). 
Calibration curves provide a graphic evaluation of how 
well calibrated subjects are. A subject, or group of 
subjects, are perfectly calibrated if, for all responses 
assigned the same probability correct, the proportion 
correct is equal to the probability assigned. Therefore, 
responses to which a perfectly calibrated subject assigns a 
probability of being correct 80% of the time will be 
correct 80% of the time. A graph showing the hit rate 
(percentage correct) for each probability rating given is 
called a calibration curve. 
A perfectly calibrated subject would have a 
"calibration curve" that lay completely on the diagonal; 
meaning that responses they assigned .50 probability of 
being correct would be correct 50% of the time, the 
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responses they assigned a .60 probability of being correct 
would be correct 60% of the time, and so on. An 
underconfident subject would have a calibration curve that 
lay above the diagonal. That would mean, for example, that 
responses assigned a .50 probability correct may be correct 
60% of the time, and those assigned a .60 probability 
correct may be correct 65% of the time, and so on up the 
probability scale. The most common finding in confidence 
judgment research is that subjects tend to be overconfident 
(Lichtenstein, et al., 1982). overconfident subjects show 
calibration curves that lay below the diagonal. For 
example, when overconfident subjects gave responses a .50 
probability rating, they may only be correct 45% of the 
time, and for a .60 rating be correct only 50% of the time, 
etc. 
An equation measuring the adequacy of calibration was 
proposed by Murphy (1973): Calibration = 1/NE n (rt -c )'.* 
t: ,, t: t 
*N=total number of responses 
nt=number of times rtwas used 
rt=probability rating 
ct=probability correct for all items assigned ~ 
T=total number of response categories used 
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A perfectly calibrated subject would score 0 on this 
measure. The worst possible score, 1.0, could be obtained 
only by those who always give the highest probability 
rating (absolutely sure) when wrong, and always give the 
lowest rating (total guess) when right. 
Murphy (1973) also proposed an equation to measure 
resolution. Resolution measures the ability of the 
responder to discriminate different degrees of subjective 
uncertainty by sorting the responses into categories whose 
respective ratings of percentage correct are maximally 
different from the overall percentage correct. A flat 
(horizontal) calibration curve shows no resolution: a 
steeper curve shows good resolution. The higher the 
resolution score, the better the subjects resolution 
ability. 
The over/underconfidence measure is a simpler and more 
commonly used measure of confidence judgment accuracy than 
the calibration and resolution measures. The equation given 
by Lichtenstein et al. (1977) is: 
r 
Over/underconfidence = 1/N~nt(~-c~). 
t:•f 
A rearrangement of the terms in this equation shows that 
over/underconfidence is equal to the differences between 
the mean of the probability responses and the overall 
proportion correct. Overconfidence is shown by a positive 
score, underconfidence by a negative score. 
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The final measure used to analyze confidence judgment 
accuracy is the confidence accuracy quotient (CAQ). The CAQ 
is a ratio, the numerator of which is the difference 
between the mean confidence assigned to right items and 
mean confidence assigned to wrong items, and a denominator 
that is the square root of the pooled variance of the 
subject's confidence judgments for right and wrong answers. 
The CAQ is similar to ~ in a signal detection analysis, 
and equals zero when a subject cannot discriminate right 
and wrong answers. The CAQ is affected by guessing in a 
forced-choice procedure, like the two-alternative choice 
situation (true or false) used in the present study 
(Shaughnessy, 1979). In this type of task, a certain 
proportion of responses given a very low confidence rating 
( for example .50) will be correct by chance. Confidence 
values assigned to these responses will tend to lower the 
mean confidence of right answers, lessening the difference 
between mean confidence for right and wrong answers. 
Therefore, although the CAQ is still an accurate measure of 
confidence accuracy in a two-alternative choice situation, 
the CAQ scores in designs like the present study are likely 
to be lower than for studies using an increased number of 
alternatives (for example, four-item multiple choice 
questions) from which to choose responses and give 
confidence ratings. 
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To be included in the following analyses, subjects had 
to meet several criteria. First, any subjects who answered 
less than a chance level (50% of the items) correct were 
not included in the final analyses, and only subjects who 
participted in both Trials 1 and 2 of the experiment were 
included. The difference in the number of subjects used in 
each comparison group is the result of careful subject 
matching for proportion of correct responses. Lichtenstein 
et al., (1982) report that calibration differences between 
groups of subjects can be affected by differences in 
proportion of items subjects have responded to correctly. 
The proportion of responses correct between groups must be 
controlled. The maximum number of young subjects in the 
young subject comparison groups that resulted in the best 
proportion correct "match" was 17 per group. The maximum 
number of subjects in the young versus older subjects 
comparison groups was 14 per group, and the number of older 
subjects being compared to other older subjects that 
resulted in the best match was 12 per group. (All the young 
subjects are taken from the same pool of 34 subjects that 
met all the criteria for the experiment: the older subjects 
are taken from the same pool of 28 subjects that met the 
same criteria.) 
No significant differences were found in proportion 
correct between matched subjects in any of the comparison 
groups, since the subjects had been matched so that 
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proportion correct would be as similar as possible between 
comparison groups. The comparison groups to be discussed 
include: comparisons between young and older subjects 
(Tables 1-4) in both the money and no money conditions for 
Trials 1 and 2: comparisons between young subjects in the 
money and no money condition, and within each condition, 
between Trials 1 and 2 (Tables S-8): and comparisons 
between older subjects in the money and no money condition, 
and within each condition, between Trials 1 and 2 (Tables 9-
12). (Appendix D includes calibration curves for all the 
subjects before matching took place). 
Item analysis based on response performance revealed 
that item difficulty distributions (ranging from number of 
items correct by 100% of the subjects to number of items 
correct by 0% of the subjects) for lists used by young and 
older subjects in both money and no money conditions (n=l4 
in each condition) on Trial 1 (Table 13) and Trial 2 (Table 
14 ) were not significantly different. (Chi-square analysis 
was used, and cells with errors of 9 or above were grouped 
together to enable large enough frequencies for chi-square 
analysis). The item difficulty distribution pattern was 
similar between the young and older subjects. For example, 
in Table 13, 33% of the items on Trial 1 were answered 
incorrectly by 2 or fewer older subjects in the money 
group, and similarly 32% of the items were answered 
incorrectly by 2 or fewer of the younger subjects in the 
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money group. Within the same groups, 10% of the items were 
answered incorrectly by 11-14 of the older subjects, and 
12% of the items were answered incorrectly by 11-14% of the 
younger subjects. 
As previously discussed, the use of calibration curves 
is the most common way to display confidence rating 
results. Calibration curves are shown in Figures 1-12. In 
order to construct the figures, the 0-5 point rating scale 
that subjects used for their confidence judgments was first 
converted to a .50 to 1.00 probability scale. This 
converted scale was also used to carry out the analyses of 
the dependent variables (over/underconfidence, calibration, 
resolution, etc.) summarized in Tables 1-12. Significant 
differences in these variables will be noted in Tables 1-
12, and cited in the text. 
Comparisons between young and older subjects 
The calibration curve comparing young (~=14) and older 
subjects (~=14) in the money condition of Trial 1 is shown 
in Figure 1. Both groups showed overconfidence at each 
confidence rating level, except for the .50 level. The 
calibration curve for older subjects was closer to the 
"perfect calibration" diagonal line at the lower rating 
levels (.50-.70) than the curve for younger subjects, but 
the younger subjects were better calibrated than the older 
subjects at the .90 and 1.00 rating levels. Table 1 shows 
that there were no significant differences between the two 
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groups in any of the confidence rating measures analyzed. 
Figure 2 displays the calibration curves for younger 
and older subjects on Trial 1 of the no money reinforcement 
condition. Although both groups again show overconfidence 
in scale use, the older subjects are closer to the diagonal 
calibration line than the younger subjects at the .60 and 
.70 levels. The only significant difference found in the 
analyses between these groups shown in Table 2 was in the 
resolution measure, where older subjects showed poorer 
resolution, with a mean resolution score of .024, than the 
younger subjects with .034, ~ (26)= 2.13, p< .05. The 
calibration curve for older subjects in Figure 2 is 
"flatter" than the curve for younger subjects, reflecting 
the resolution score difference between groups. 
The calibration curves for young and older subjects in 
the second trial of the money reinforcement condition is 
seen in Figure 3. The curve for younger subjects is closer 
to the perfect calibration line for the .60 and .70 
ratings, and also for the .90 and 1.00 ratings. 
Significant differences in over/underconfidence and 
calibration were found between the young and older groups 
(Table 3). Mean over/under confidence was .102 for young 
subjects and .174 for older subjects, ~(26)= -2.60, p (.05. 
The mean calibration score was .029 for young subjects and 
.059 for older subjects t,(26)= -3.04, p< .05. Younger 
subjects had significantly higher resolution scores and 
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lower confidence scores than older subjects; young subjects 
average resolution score was .037, and older subjects score 
was .018, ~(26)=3.51, E<-05. The average confidence score 
for young subjects was .751, and for older subjects .823, 
t(26)= -3.09, p<.05. On the second trial of the money 
- -
condition, then, younger subjects were better calibrated, 
especially at the higher confidence rating levels. Older 
subjects were better calibrated at the lower levels, but 
had flatter calibration curves, again reflecting their 
poorer resolution abilities. 
Figure 4 contains the calibration curves for young and 
older subjects on Trial 2 of the no money reinforcement 
condition. Both groups of subjects were again 
overconfident in their confidence ratings, although the 
older subjects had a flatter line, being closer to the 
perfect calibration line than the younger subjects at the 
.60 and .80 levels. As shown in Table 4, young and older 
subjects were significantly different in only the CAQ and 
resolution measures. Young subjects were better than the 
older subjects at discriminating correct from incorrect 
answers. The mean CAQ rating was .801 for younger subjects 
and .488 for older subjects, _i(26)=2.73, g( .05; young 
subjects showed better resolution, mean score .046, than 
older subjects, with mean score .023, t(26)= 5.08, p (.05. 
Therefore, in comparisons between young and older 
subjects, in both money and no money conditions, on Trials 
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1 and 2, significant differences in over/under confidence 
and calibration were found only on the second trial of the 
money condition {Table 3), where older subjects were 
significantly more overconfident than younger subjects. 
This performance difference on Trial 2 suggests that young 
subjects seemed to be affected by simple feedback about 
their overconfidence on Trial 1 more than the older 
subjects were. Younger subjects showed better resolution 
than older subjects in each comparison except for that of 
the first trial of the money condition. This resulted in 
the "flatter" calibration curves seen for the older 
subjects, since they appeared less overconfident than the 
younger subjects at the lower end of the rating scale, and 
more overconfident at the higher end of the scale. 
Young Subject Comparisons 
Calibration curves for young subject comparisons 
between Trials 1 and 2 of the money {~=17} and no money 
(n=l7} condition are shown in Figures 5-8. Figure 5 shows 
that the calibration curves for young subjects between the 
first trials of the money and no money condition were very 
similar. No significant differences were found between any 
of the calibration measures listed in Table 5, suggesting 
that young subject's made similar confidence rating 
judgments, whether they made confidence ratings in terms of 
a money scale or a number scale. 
Calibration curves for the young subjects of the 
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second trial for those in the money and no money conditions 
are displayed in Figure 6. Again, the calibration curves 
for both groups are similar, and no significant differences 
were found between the calibration measures listed in Table 
6. 
Figure 7 presents the calibration curves for young 
subjects in the money condition on Trials 1 and 2. 
Calibration improved at the .70 confidence rating level on 
Trial 2, with some improvement also shown on Trial 2 at the 
.90 and 1.00 level as well. Significant differences 
between these trials were found in the mean confidence, 
over/under confidence and calibration measures with 
subjects showing less overconfidence in their confidence 
rating judgments on Trial 2. On Trial 1, subjects showed a 
higher mean confidence level of .780 as compared with .753 
on Trial 2, ~{16)=3.59, p <.05. On Trial 1, subjects showed 
a mean over/underconfidence score of .117 and on Trial 2 of 
.085, t{l6)= 3.37, p(.05, and on the first trial, subjects 
in the money condition had an average calibration score of 
.035, and on the second trial a mean calibration score of 
.025, t{l6)=3.42, 2(.05. Therefore, it appears that young 
subjects in the money condition were affected by feedback 
about their Trial 1 performance, making more cautious 
ratings during Trial 2 than they had during Trial 1. 
Calibration curves on Trials 1 and 2 of young subjects 
in the no money condition are shown in Figure 8. The 
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curves are similar, with the exception of the .70 
confidence rating. Subject ratings on Trial 2 were closer 
to the perfect calibration line than the ratings on Trial 
1. Significant differences were found between Trials 1 and 
2 for mean confidence ratings, .797 on Trial 1 and .772 on 
Trial 2, ~(16)= 4.16, p(.05, and for resolution, with a 
mean resolution of .033 on Trial 1 and .044 on Trial 2, 
~(16) = -3.68, p(.05. However, no significant differences 
were found between trials in calibration or 
over/underconfidence measures. Feedback appeared to have 
some affect on young subjects in the no money condition, 
although it did not affect their confidence judgments as 
much as it affected the young subjects in the money 
condition. 
For young subjects then, comparisons between young 
subjects in the money and no money conditions displayed 
significant differences in over/underconfidence and 
calibration measures only between Trials 1 and 2 of the 
money condition, where subjects were better calibrated on 
the second trial, after feedback had been given. 
Older Subject Comparisons 
Calibration curves are presented in Figure 9 for older 
subjects on Trial 1 between the money and no money 
condition. Both groups showed overconfidence, with the 
curves overlapping so that the no money subjects were 
better calibrated at the .60,.70 and .90 rating levels, and 
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the money subjects better calibrated at the other rating 
levels. No significant differences were found between the 
money and no money conditions for the confidence rating 
measures shown in Table 9, indicating that on Trial 1, 
older subjects, like younger subjects, showed few 
differences between confidence ratings made using a money 
scale versus those made using a number scale. 
Figure 10 shows calibration curves for older subjects 
in the money and no money conditions of Trial 2. Subjects 
in the no money condition were closer to the perfect 
calibration line for the .50 and .70 confidence rating 
levels than were subjects in the money condition, although 
the calibration lines are similar for .80-1.00 confidence 
ratings. Again, no significant differences were found 
between the money and no money conditions for the 
confidence rating measures shown in Table 10. 
Figure 11 presents comparisons of calibration curves 
for older subjects in the money condition between Trials 1 
and 2. The curves here overlap, with subjects on Trial 1 
being closer to the diagonal line for confidence ratings 
.60 and .70, and subjects on Trial 2 having points on the 
curve closer to the diagonal line for the .80 and .90 
levels. No significant differences between trials were 
found for the measures listed in Table 11. The confidnence 
ratings of older subjects, then, were not effected as much 
as the ratings of younger subjects after feedback about 
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their Trial 1 performance in the money condition. 
Figure 12 displays calibration curves for older 
subjects in the no money condition between Trials 1 and 2. 
Subjects in Trial 1 have a calibration curve closer to the 
perfect calibration line at the .70, .90 and 1.00 levels. 
Significant differences between Trials 1 and 2 were found 
for mean confidence and over/under confidence measures. 
Mean confidence on Trial 1 was .804, and Trial 2 .825, 
t(ll)=-2.85, p (.05, and mean over/under confidence was 
- -
.144 on Trial 1 and .167. In the no money condition, older 
subjects displayed more overconfidence in their confidence 
ratings after they had received feedback about their Trial 
1 performance. This is a pattern that is nearly opposite 
to that shown by younger subjects, who were less 
overconfident in the no money condition. 
For older subjects then, significant differences in 
confidence and over/under confidence were found only 
between Trials 1 and 2 of the no money condition. These 
subjects appeared to be more overconfident in their 
confidence judgments on Trial 2 than they were on Trial 1. 
Confidence Rating Scale Comparisons 
Young and older subjects did use the confidence scale 
differently. Table 15 displays the total distribution 
scale for young and older subjects in both money and no 
money conditions (n=l4 each), on Trial 1 , and Table 16 on 
Trial 2. Chi-square analysis of both tables yielded 
significant results. . vz. < 53 On Tr~al 1, ~ (15)= 278.45, p .05, 
- -
and for Trial 2, Xz(l5)= 444.06, p (.05. On Trial 1, the 
- -
largest differences in scale use are seen between the young 
and older subjects in the money condition. Younger subjects 
were more likely to choose the lower ratings (0,1 and 2) 
with 45.71% of their ratings given to these ratings as 
compared to 34.57% of ratings at these lower levels for the 
older subjects in the money condition. These older 
subjects were also more likely to choose the highest rating 
of 5 (41.86% of their ratings) as compared to 28.29% of the 
younger subjects ratings given to the highest scale level. 
On Trial 2, differences in scale use are seen between 
younger and older subjects in both the money and no money 
conditions. For example, older subjects in the money 
condition used the lower scale levels (0-2) 33.64% of the 
time, and in the no money condition, 28.86%, compared to 
younger subjects who used the lower scale levels mor~ 
frequently, 50.86% for those in the money condition, and 
41% for those in the no money condition. 
The frequency of answer and rating changes between 
Trials 1 and 2 for all conditions, and the patterns of 
those changes are shown in Tables 17 and 18. Table 17 
shows the average number of answers and ratings that were 
changed from incorrect to correct, or from correct to 
incorrect. Descriptive analysis of the pattern of the 
number of answers and ratings was similar between the four 
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groups, with a mean of 14.6 answers changed between Trials 
1 and 2, approximately half of these changes (7.33) from 
correct to incorrect, and the other half (7.29) from 
incorrect to correct. Also, approximately half the answers 
were changed without an accompanying rating change. Of the 
average total ratings changed (41.34), 82% were changed 
without an accompanying answer change. For all groups 
then, subjects were unlikely to change their answers 
between Trials 1 and 2, but they did change a substantial 
number of their ratings. 
The direction of the rating changes is shown in Table 
18. Overall, 58.66% of the ratings given to responses on 
Trial 1 were not changed by subjects on Trial 2. For young 
subjects in the money condition 56.5% of their ratings 
remained the same between Trials 1 and 2; for young 
subjects in the no money condition, 60.2% were not changed. 
For older subjects in the money condition, 59.4% of the 
ratings were not changed from Trial 1 to 2, and 58.7% were 
not changed for older subjects in the no money condition. 
Of the rating changes made, young subjects in both 
conditions were more likely to change from higher ratings 
to lower ratings, showing less confidence in their answers 
on Trial 2 than on Trial 1. For young subjects in the 
money condition, 68% of their rating changes were from 
higher ratings to lower ratings, and similarly, 69% of the 
changes for young subjects in the no money condition were 
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from higher ratings on Trial 1 to lower ratings on Trial 2. 
This suggests that rating changes were not made randomly, 
and may have been a reaction to the feedback that subjects 
received between Trials 1 and 2. 
For older subjects in the money condition, almost as 
many of their rating changes were from high to low (45.20%) 
as from low to high (54.8%) between Trials 1 and 2. Older 
subjects in the no money condition showed a rating change 
pattern that was different from the younger subjects 
pattern, with 61.2% of their rating changes going from 
lower ratings on Trial 1 to higher ratings on Trial 2. 
Older subjects in the money condition seemed to display a 
random pattern of rating changes, whereas the pattern for 
subjects in the no money condition indicated a tendency to 
give higher ratings to answers on Trial 2 than on Trial 1. 
In summary, young and older subjects showed 
significant calibration differences only on Trial 2 of the 
money condition, where younger subjects were better 
calibrated than older subjects. Also, younger subjects 
showed an overall better resolution ability than older 
subjects. 
Comparisons for younger subjects in the money and no 
money conditions indicated that feedback did have an effect 
on these subjects. Subjects in the money condition showed 
better calibration on Trial 2, after feedback on their 
Trial 1 performance, than they had shown on Trial 1. Young 
subjects in the no money condition had lower mean 
confidence on Trial 2 than on Trial 1, also indicating 
lower confidence judgments after feedback. 
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Comparisons for older subjects found significant 
differences only between Trial 1 and 2 of the no money 
condition, where subjects appeared more overconfident on 
Trial 2, after feedback on their performance, than on Trial 
1 . 
DISCUSSION 
The basic goal of the present study was to examine the 
effects of three variables on subject confidence judgment 
accuracy. These three variables were: feedback given to 
subjects about their performance: monetary incentive: and 
most importantly, the age of the subjects. 
The effects of feedback on confidence judgments will 
be discussed first. An overview of the results indicated 
that feedback seemed to have more of an effect on the 
confidence judgments of younger subjects than on older 
subjects. The next effect to be discussed will be the 
effect of monetary incentive on confidence judgments. The 
results suggested that, although there seemed to be no 
dramatic changes between the confidence judgments of 
subjects using "money bets 11 to make their confidence 
ratings, and those using a simple number scale, the young 
"money incentive" subjects, at least, seemed to show less 
overconfidence between Trials 1 and 2 than the subjects in 
the "no money incentive" condition. Finally, overall 
confidence judgment differences between young and older 
subjects will be discussed. In general, older subjects 
seemed to use the confidence rating scale differently than 
young subjects. They showed poorer "resolution", or 
ability to sort their ratings into different scale levels. 
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This resulted in "flatter" calibration curves for the older 
subjects than for the younger subjects, since they were 
less overconfident than younger subjects at the lower end 
of the confidence rating scale (.50 and .60 ratings) and 
more overconfident at the higher end of the scale (1.00 
ratings). 
Feedback 
Several previous studies have indicated that subjects 
can be "trained" to produce more realistic confidence 
ratings by giving them •• feedback 11 about their performance. 
Lichtenstein et al. (1980) gave subjects comprehensive 
feedback, over multiple training sessions, about their 
confidence judgments. Subjects did show improved ratings, 
with most of the improvement occuring after the first 
training session. Zechmeister et al. (1986) have also 
shown that one training session can help subjects, 
especially low achieving subjects, improve their 
calibration scores, and Arkes et al. (1982) found that even 
in the absence of training, simply informing subjects that 
they will have to explain their reasons for their answer 
choices, to other subjects, helps to improve subject 
calibration. 
In the present study, the feedback was brief and 
intentionally "vague". Subjects were simply provided with 
a number indicating, in the no money condition, the number 
of "points" that corresponded to their ratings of incorrect 
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answers. For the money condition, the feedback given was 
the number of pennies that the subjects would have lost 
during Trial 1 on "bet ratings" given to incorrect answers. 
All subjects were then told that this feedback meant that 
they had been overconfident in some of their ratings, 
giving high confidence judgments to some of their incorrect 
answers. They were told to be as accurate as they could be 
on the second trial. "Money condition" subjects were told 
that they could win back some of the money they had lost if 
they were more accurate in their ratings on the second 
trial. 
Young subjects did seem to be affected by this 
feedback, showing less overconfidence in the confidence 
judgments on Trial 2, after feedback, than they had shown 
in their Trial 1 judgments. This is reflected in the lower 
confidence, over/under confidence, and calibration scores 
shown on Trial 2 for young subjects in the money condition, 
and lower confidence ratings on Trial 2 for young subjects 
in the no money condition. Young subjects in both groups 
changed approximately 40% of their ratings between Trials 1 
and 2, with almost 70% of these changes indicating less 
overconfidence on Trial 2, i.e., with lower ratings on 
Trial 2 than had been chosen on Trial 1. It seems, then, 
that for college aged subjects, even brief feedback about 
"overconfidence" can affect subject confidence judgment 
ratings. 
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The effect of feedback on older subjects is not clear. 
There were no statistically significant differences between 
the Trial 1 and Trial 2 performances for older subjects in 
the money condition. These older subjects, like the 
younger subjects, did change about 40% of their ratings 
between Trial 1 and Trial 2. However, these changes seemed 
almost "random", with approximately half of the changes 
going from lower ratings on Trial 1 to higher ratings on 
Trial 2, and the other half of the changes going from high 
ratings on Trial 1 to lower ratings on Trial 2. 
Older subjects did seem to show more "fatigue" on 
Trial 2 than younger subjects, and may have been exhibiting 
less concentration on their Trial 2 ratings than they 
exhibited on their Trial 1 ratings. But even if this were 
true, it does not adequately explain the rating changes 
seen between Trial 1 and 2 for the older subjects in the no 
money condition. 
In the no money condition, older subjects appeared to 
be more overconfident after feedback than they were before 
they received feedback. This result was opposite of what 
had been expected. Again, like older and younger subjects 
in the other conditions, these older subjects changed 
approximately 40% of their ratings. Of these rating 
changes, over 60% were from lower ratings on Trial 1 to 
higher ratings on Trial 2. Although this pattern of rating 
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changes is not as dramatic as the rating changes shown for 
young subject (from high ratings on Trial 1 to lower 
ratings on Trial 2), it was reflected in significantly 
higher confidence and over/under confidence measures on 
Trial 2 than on Trial 1. One explanation for this pattern 
may be the greater "familiarity" that subjects had with the 
material on Trial 2 than they had had with it on Trial 1. 
These older subjects may have reasoned "I've heard that 
answer before, therefore I'm confident it is correct". For 
example, Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino (1977) found that 
repeated general information statements were more likely to 
be judged as "true" than similar, non-repeated statements. 
Both young and older subjects were likely to make the 
same answer responses on Trial 2 that they had made on 
Trial 1. For example, these older subjects in the no monay 
condition changed only 13% of their answers between Trial 1 
and 2, and so they were "familiar" with these answers on 
Trial 2. In the absence of any "monetary" incentive to 
temper their responses, the older subjects in the no money 
condition may have been more likely to choose their 
confidence ratings based on "familiarity" with the 
material. 
Interaction Between Feedback and Monetary Incentive 
Fischhoff et al. (1977) found that subjects were 
"overconfidently" willing to stake money on confidence 
judgments that they had already made. "Betting" money on 
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their judgments did not cause subjects to respond 
cautiously, since most subjects in the study would have 
lost money if these bets had been real. The present study 
examined whether having subjects make money bets as 
confidence ratings would make subjects more cautious in 
their responses. 
Monetary incentive did not have a significant effect 
on subject confidence judgments on Trial 1, since the 
confidence judgment measures between the money and no money 
conditions for the Trial 1 ratings were not significantly 
different for the younger or older subject groups. 
Although there were no significant differences between the 
money and no money conditions on Trial 1 for either age 
group, young subjects in the money condition did use the 
scale differently than young subjects in the no money 
condition. In the money condition, young subjects were 
less likely to use the highest rating level of 1.00 (used 
only 28.3% of the time) than were subjects in the no money 
condition, who used the highest rating level 37.5% of the 
time on Trial 1. This indicates the possibility that money 
could have influenced the young subjects in the money 
condition by causing them to be less likely to want to 
"bet" the highest amount of money on the accuracy of their 
responses than young subjects in the no money condition. 
It is possible that the low amount of money at stake (penny 
bets) made it less likely that there would be "significant" 
differences between the two groups than if higher money 
stakes had been used. 
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Younger subjects did appear to be less overconfident 
in both the money and no money conditions after they had 
received feedback. This effect was most apparent in the 
money condition, where subjects showed lower 
over/underconfidence and calibration scores, as well as 
lower confidence scores, on Trial 2. Since using a 11 money 11 
scale did not cause subjects to make different confidence 
judgments than those made when using a 11 point scale 11 on 
Trial 1, it is likely that the use of this 11 low wager .. 
money scale cannot completely account for the differences 
between Trials 1 and 2 for the money and no money 
conditions. 
It is true that subjects in the money groups were 
given a monetary incentive to work toward on Trial 2 that 
was not given to the no money groups, since the money 
groups were told that they could win back some of the money 
they had lost by givng more accurate ratings on the second 
trial. But the feedback given to subjects in the money 
groups between Trials 1 and 2 was also more 11 COncrete 11 than 
the feedback given to subjects in the no money group. 
Subjects in the money group were given feedback about the 
amount of pennies (a concrete example) that they had lost 
by giving overconfident ratings to incorrect answers, 
whereas the no money group was given feedback about the 
amount of points (a more abstract concept) that they had 
given in ratings to incorrect answers. 
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Both groups of young subjects, therefore, were more 
likely to make confidence rating changes that resulted in 
less overconfidence on Trial 2. It has also been shown that 
monetary incentive alone did not have a significant effect 
on the young subject's ratings on Trial 1. It may be, 
then, that the greater difference between Trials 1 and 2 of 
the money condition as compared to the difference in 
calibration of Trials 1 and 2 of the no money condition can 
be accounted for more by the "concreteness" of the feedback 
given, than by the monetary incentive indicated. 
Confidence judgment results were also different 
between Trial 1 and Trial 2 for older subjects in both the 
money and no money conditions. As stated earlier, older 
subjects in the money condition appeared to make random 
rating changes between Trials 1 and 2, with no significant 
confidence judgment differences between trials. Older 
subjects in the no money condition showed more 
overconfidence through their ratings on Trial 2. The brief 
feedback given to subjects about their ratings on Trial 1 
did not seem to have much of an effect on the Trial 2 
confidence ratings of the older subjects. 
It may be that there was a tendency for both groups of 
older subjects to become more overconfident on Trial 2, 
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because of the greater .. familiarity" of the material. P..s 
already suggested, it is also possible that there is a 
"fatigue" factor involved, with older subjects being more 
tired of the task on Trial 2. This may have caused them to 
pay less attention to their Trial 2 ratings. 
This possible tendency to be overconfident on Trial 2 
may have been "tempered .. somewhat by the more "concrete" 
feedback given to the older subjects in the money group. 
This hypothesis could help to explain the "seemingly 
random" rating changes shown by the older subjects in the 
money group. They may have been likely to give higher 
ratings to answers that now, on Trial 2 seemed more 
familiar, but also to keep the feedback about their 
overconfidence in mind, which could have resulted in less 
overconfidence in those answers that still seemed 
unfamiliar. 
Age Differences 
Other studies examining age differences in confidence 
ratings have indicated no significant differences between 
young and older adults (Perlmutter,l978:Lachman et 
al,l979). It is interesting to note, therefore, the 
different confidence rating patterns seen between young and 
older subjects in this experiment. 
Most of the differences between age groups, as already 
mentioned, seemed to occur during Trial 2 of the study. 
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For example, in the 11money condition,. comparisons, young 
subjects were significatly less overconfident than older 
subjects, on Trial 2. The rating scale was used 
differently by young and older subjects of both groups for 
both trials, but the dramatic differences were seen on 
Trial 2. For example, 43.4% of the older subject's ratings 
on Trial 2 of the money condition were made at the highest 
1.00 level, and 43.7% of the older no money subjects 
ratings. This contrasts with only 27% of the young money 
subjects ratings and 36.7% of the money subject's ratings 
given to the highest 1.00 rating level. 
Although the highest number of ratings for both age 
groups occurred at the 1.00 level, older subjects were more 
likely to choose this rating on both trials than were the 
younger subjects. Botwinick (1969) indicated that the 
older subjects in his experiment were more likely to choose 
the most extreme response (in the case of his experiment, 
the most cautious response) than were younger subjects. 
When this extreme response was not available to them, they 
showed the same pattern of responses as younger subjects. 
It may be that older subjects, who may have had less recent 
experience with test taking than younger subjects, have a 
more difficult time in simply using the rating scale than 
younger subjects. The older subjects did tend to have 
11 flatter" calibration curves, reflecting problems in 
sorting their ratings into different levels of uncertainty 
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that could best reflect the actual confidence they had in 
their responses. As Perlmutter et al.(l978) and Zivian et 
al. (1983) pointed out, being 11 in or out of school" may be 
more of a factor in explaining differences between groups 
in metacognitive skills than are age differences. 
Implications of the Present Study 
Cavanaugh and Perlmutter (1982), in a critical 
examination of metacognitive research, concluded that the 
value in this research has been its demonstration of 
metacognitive ability differences between different groups 
of subjects, and the weaknesses in this research have 
centered around the inability of these studies to show a 
direct relationship between metamemory ability and memory 
performance. The present study is valuable as a 
demonstration of differences in the confidence rating 
patterns of young and older adults. However, future 
research needs to examine how metacognitive knowledge is 
acquired, and how it is related to memory performance. 
There is also a need to demonstrate how the 
metacognitive tasks that researchers have used relate to 
"real" memory monitoring skills of people in everyday 
situations. In confidence judgement tasks, for example, 
researchers need to demonstrate that changes made by 
subjects in the use of the confidence scale reflect actual 
changes in their metacognitive skills. 
Tulving and Madigan (1970) commented that research 
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concerned with "knowledge o.f our own knowlegde" may be one 
of the most important areas to explore in advancing our 
insights about memory processes. In order to provide this 
insight, metacognitive research will need to go beyond 
testing subject performance on single metacognitive tasks, 
and instead establish a standard procedure of using 
multiple assessments of memory knowledge to analyze 
metacognitive abilities. 
In conclusion, the results of the present study 
indicate that even brief feedback about overconfidence may 
have some effect on lowering the overconfidence of young 
subjects. The results suggest that using a "money" rating 
scale, where subjects could win or lose money depending on 
the accuracy of their confidence ratings, may lead young 
subjects to be less overconfident in their ratings, 
especially if more money was at stake than in the present 
study. Finally, older subjects seem to have more 
"resolution" problems in using the rating scales provided 
than do younger subjects, and older subjects are more 
likely than younger subjects to choose the most extreme 
1. 00 rating. 
Money incentives and feedback seem to have little 
effect on the confidence ratings of older subjects. Older 
subjects may have become more tired and/or bored with this 
task as time went on, than younger subjects. Older 
subjects may also have been effected by the "familiarity" 
of the task on Trial 2. 
Since young and older subjects did show similar 
ratings on Trial 1, there is no reason to believe that 
older subjects may actually be different in confidence 
rating skills than are younger subjects. Subjects of any 
age who are not familiar with rating scales, and not used 
to taking tests, may show the same confidence judgment 
11 patterns 11 shown by the older subjects in this experiment. 
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Table 1 
Performance of young and older subjects on the first trial 
of the money reinforcement condition N=l4. 
Measure YMl OMl t value 
X Correct 64.5 64.5 0.0 
X Confidence .773 .816 -1.80 
X Over-Under Conf .128 .171 -1.58 
X CAQ .605 .465 1.21 
X Calibration .039 .058 -1.97 
X Resolution .034 .024 1.53 
Table 2 
Performance of young and older subjects on the first trial 
of the no money reinforcement condition ...N.=l4. 
Measure YNMl ONMl t value 
X Correct 66.93 66.79 0.05 
X Confidence .812 .808 0.15 
X Over-Under Conf .143 .140 0.07 
X CAQ .681 .485 1.46 
X Calibration .045 .05 -0.40 
X Resolution .034 .024 2.13* 
*2 (.05 
Table 3 
Performance of young and older subjects on trial 2 of the 
money reinforcement condition ~=14 
Measure YM2 OM2 t value 
X Correct 64.93 64.86 0.03 
X Confidence .751 .823 -3.09* 
X Over-Under Conf • H'J2 .174 -2.60* 
X CAQ .694 .428 2.28* 
X Calibration .029 .059 -3.04* 
X Resolution .037 .018 3.51* 
Table 4 
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Performance of young and older subjects on the second trial 
of the no money reinforcement condition N=l4 
Measure YNM2 ONM2 t value 
X Correct 65.71 65.79 -0.03 
x· Confidence .785 .833 -1.93 
X Over-Under Conf .128 .175 -1.35 
X CAQ .801 .488 2.73* 
"X Calibration .045 .060 -1.01 
X Resolution .046 .023 5.08* 
*£ (. 05 
Table 5 
Performance of young subjects on trial 1 of the money and 
no money conditions.N=l7 
Measure YMl YNMl t value 
X Correct 66.29 66.76 -0.21 
X Confidence .780 .797 -0.93 
X Over-Under Conf .117 .130 -0.54 
X CAQ .726 .698 0.25 
X Calibration .035 .039 -0.58 
X Resolution .037 .033 0.71 
Table 6 
Performance of young subjects on trial 2 of the money and 
no money conditions. N=l7 
Heasure YM2 YNM2 t value 
X Correct 66.82 66.18 0.28 
X Confidence .753 .772 -1.05 
X Over-Under Conf .085 .110 -0.99 
X CAQ .780 .777 
X Calibration .025 .040 -1.71 
X Resolution .038 .044 -1.27 
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Table 7 
Performance of young subjects in trials 1 and 2 of the 
money reinforcement condition. E=l7 
Measure YMl YM2 t value 
X Correct 66.29 66.82 -0.67 
X Confidence .780 .753 3.59* 
X Over-Under Conf .• 117 .085 3.37* 
X CAQ .726 .780 -0.90 
X Calibration .035 .025 3.42* 
X Resolution .037 .038 -0.05 
Table 8 
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Performance of young subjects for trials 1 and 2 of the no 
money reinforcement conditions. ]l=l7 
Measure YNMl YNM2 t value 
-x· Correct 66.76 66.18 0.71 
X Confidence .797 .772 4.16* 
X Over-Under Conf .. 130 .110 2.08 
X CAQ .698 .777 -1.51 
X Calibration .039 .040 -0.33 
X Resolution .033 .044 -3.68* 
Table 9 
Performance of older subjects on the first trial of the 
money and no money reinforcement conditions. H=l2 
Measure OMl ONMl t value 
X Correct 65.58 66 -0.14 
X Confidence .806 .804 0.04 
X Over-Under Conf •• 150 .144 0.16 
-x· CAQ .507 .453 0.34 
X Calibration .050 .054 -0.29 
X Resolution .026 .024 0.39 
Table 10 
Performance of older subjects on trial 2 of the money and 
no money reinforcement conditions. ..N=l2 
Measure OM2 ONM2 t value 
X Correct 65.75 65.83 -0.02 
X Confidence .814 .825 -0.37 
-x Over-Under Conf •• l56 .167 -0.28 
X CAQ .475 •• 483 -0.06 
X Calibration .052 .057 -0.31 
"'X Resolution .02 .022 -0.34 
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Table 11 
Performance of older subjects on the first and second 
trials of the money reinforcement condition. N=l2 
Measure OMl OM2 t value 
X Correct 65.58 65.75 -0.12 
X Confidence .806 .814 -.84 
X Over-Under conf .• 150 .156 -.40 
X CAQ .507 .475 0.37 
·x Calibration .050 .052 -0.32 
X Resolution .026 .02 1.28 
Table 12 
Performance of older subjects on trial 1 and 2 of the no 
money reinforcement condition. li=12 
r-teasure ONMl ONM2 t value 
X Correct 66.00 65.83 0.23 
·x Confidence .804 .825 -2.85* 
"X Over-Under Conf •. 144 .167 -2.36* 
'"X CAQ .453 .483 -0.51 
"X Calibration .054 .057 -.68 
Y Resolution .024 .022 0.57 
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Table 13 
Item Difficulty Distributions of Test Lists Used by Young 
and Older Subjects on Trial 1 of the Money and No Money 
Conditions* 
Number of Errors 
0-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 13-14 
Older 
Money 33 15 18 13 11 7 3 
Trial 1 
No Money 34 20 17 13 8 7 1 
Trial 1 
Young 
Honey 32 17 20 13 6 9 3 
Trial 1 
No Money 31 20 19 19 7 1 3 
Trial 1 
*This table lists the number of test items at each 
difficulty level. There were 14 subjects in each of the 
four conditions shown 
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Table 14 
Item Difficulty Distributions of Test Lists Used by Young 
and Older Subjects on Trial 2 of the Money and No Money 
Conditions* 
Number of Errors 
0-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 13-14 
Older 
Money 32 12 24 16 9 5 2 
Trial 2 
No Money 34 13 18 18 10 7 0 
Trial 2 
Young 
Honey 27 22 19 15 6 9 2 
Trial 2 
No Money 31 18 18 19 10 1 3 
Trial 2 
*This table lists the number of test items at each 
level. There were 14 subjects in each of the four 
conditions shown. 
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Table 15 
Total Frequency of Use of the 6 Point Rating Scale (Ratings 
from 0 to 5)* 
Rating Scale 
1 2 3 4 5 
Older 
Money 227 91 166 244 86 586 
Trial 1 
Older 
No Money 312 74 99 174 185 556 
Trial 1 
Young 
Money 259 198 183 178 186 396 
Trial 1 
Young 
No Money 286 82 106 161 240 525 
Trial 1 
*Trial 1 of Young and Older Subjects in the Money and No 
Money Conditions (~=14 per condition) 
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Table 16 
Total Frequency of Use of the 6 Point Rating Scale (Ratings 
from 0 to 5)* 
Rating Scale 
1 2 3 4 5 
Older 
Money 226 43 202 249 72 608 
Trial 2 
Older 
No Money 256 59 89 177 207 612 
Trial 2 
Young 
Money 327 230 155 156 153 379 
Trial 2 
Young 
No Money 349 118 107 160 152 514 
Trial 2 
*Trial 2 of Young and Older Subjects in the Money and No 
t-Ioney Conditions (n=l4 per condition) 
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Table 17 
Average number of rating and answer changes between Trials 
1 and 2 for each condition. 
IX IX ~swers Answers Answers Ratings Ratings 
klswers Ratings ~hanged Changed Changed Changed &Answers 
Groups Changed ~hanged ~o Wron~ to Right Alone Alone Both Changed 
Young 
6.83 6.18 36.53 r~oney 13. 12 43.4 7 6.29 6.94 (n= 17) • 
I 
Young 
No Money 16.00 39.82 8.29 7. 71 9.00 32.82 7.00 (n=17) 
j 
Older 
l~oney 16. 17 40.58 8.00 8.17 7. 6 7 32.08 8.50 (n=12) 
-I 
01 der : 
flo Honey 13.17 41.25 6. 6 7 6.50 5. 75 33.83 7.42 ( n= 12) 
I • Overall 
t'e ans 14.60 141. 34 l 7. 33 7. 29 7. 22 33.97 7. 38 
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Table 18 
Direction of rating changes between Trials 1 and 2. 
Young Money (n=l7) Young No r-t>ney {n= 17) 
Trial 2 
Trial .so .60 • 70 .80 .90 Trial 
.so 9 3 .so 4 1 
.60 !11 12 
.60 3 1 
.70 4 7 • 70 
.80 39 4 
.80 
.90 1425 
.90 
1.00 11 10 1.00 
01 der Money (n= 12) 01 der No Money {n=l2) 
Tria 1 2 
Trial 1 .SO .60 .70 .RO .90 1.00 Trial 1. 00 
.so ~ 2:> 9 3 14 .so 8 
.60 0~1 ~0 17 2 11 
.60 9 
0 70 22 12 5~ 7 21 • 70 11 
0 80 IS 9 3 83 ~ .80 24 
.90 3 1 7 1 4 19 
.90 44 1. 00 19 4 8 36 1 :l 9 1 1.00 1 
The boxed numbers show the amount of ratings that were not 
changed between Trials 1 and 2 at each rating level. 
Numbers to the left of the boxed-in values are the amount 
of ratings that were changed from a higher rating on Trial 
1 to a lower rating on Trial 2. (Note: underlined numbers 
show levels at which subjects were more than twice as 
likely to change their ratings to lower ratings, i.e. show 
less confidence in the accuracy of their answer, than to 
change their ratings from lower ratings on Trial 1 to 
higher ratings on Trial 2.) Numbers to the right of the 
boxed-in numbers show the amount of ratings that were 
changed from a lower rating value to a higher rating value 
between Trials 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1. Calibration curves of young and older subjects 
on Trial 1 of the money reinforcement condition. The young 
and older subjects were matched for proportion correct on 
the general information test (N=l4). 
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Figure 2. Calibration curves of the young and older 
subjects on Trial 1 of the no money reinforcement 
condition. Young and older subjects were matched for 
number correct {N=l4). 
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Figure 3. Calibration curves for the young and older 
subjects on Trial 2 of the money reinforcement condition. 
Young and older subjects were matched for proportion 
correct (N=l4) . 
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Figure 4. Calibration curves for the young and older 
subjects on Trial 2 in the no money reinforcement 
condition. Young and older subjects were matched for 
proportion correct (N=l4). 
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Figure 5. Calibration curves for young subjects on Trial 1 
of the money and no money reinforcement conditions. Money 
and no money subjects were matched for proportion correct 
{N=l7). 
1.00 YM2• • 
YNM2• e 
.90 
1-
u .80 
LU 
~ 
~ 
0 
u .70 
~ 
0 
~ .60 
.so-
.40 .so .60 .70 
CONFIDENCE 
87 
.80 .90 1.00 
Figure 6. Calibration curves for young subjects on Trial 2 
of the money and no money conditons. Money and no money 
subjects were matched for proportion correct (N=l7). 
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Figure 7. Calibration curves for young subjects on Trial 1 
and 2 of the money reinforcement conditions. Subjects were 
matched for proportion correct so that the subjects on 
Trial 1 are the same as those in Trial 2 (N=l7). 
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Figure 8. Calibration curves for the young subjects 
between Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the no money reinforcement 
condition. Subjects were matched for proportion correct so 
that subjects on Trial 1 are the same as those on Trial 2 
(N=l7). 
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Figure 9. Calibration curves for the older subjects on 
Trial 1 of the money and no money reinforcement conditions. 
Subjects in the money and no money conditions were matched 
for proportion correct (N=l2). 
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Figure 10. Calibration curves for older subjects on Trial 
2 of the money and no money reinforcement conditions. 
Subjects in the money and no money conditions were matched 
for proportion correct (N=l2). 
1.00-
.90 
.... 
u .8 
u.a 
a:: 
a:: 
0 
u .70 
a.: 
0 
~ .60 
.50-
.40 
.40 
OM1 ... _. 
OM2 o-...o 
.50 .60 .70 
CONFIDENCE 
.80 .90 1.00 
Figure 11. Calibration curves for older subjects between 
Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the money reinforcement condition. 
Subjects were matched for proportion correct so that the 
subjects on Trial 1 are the same subjects as those on Trial 
2 (N=l2). 
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Figure 12. Calibration curves for older subjects between 
Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the no money reinforcement 
condition. Subjects were matched for proportion correct so 
that the subjects in Trial 1 are the same subjects as those 
in Trial 2 (N=l2). 
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The following are the statements that subjects responded 
true or false to. Correct answers are on the answer sheet 
(Appendix B): 
1. The capitol of France is Paris. 
2. The Bismarck is the name of Germany's largest 
battleship that was sunk in World War II. 
3. The Hague is located in Belgium. 
4. Popeye is the name of the cartoon character who eats 
spinach. 
5. Raymond is the last name of the doctor who performed 
the first successful human heart transplant. 
6. There are 2.54 centimeters in an inch (to the nearest 
hundreth). 
7. Amigo is the name of the Lone Ranger's Indian side-
kick. 
8. Montgomery was the last name of the actor who portrayed 
the father on the television show "Father Knows Best". 
9. Ibsen wrote the "Iceman Cometh" • 
10. Salk is the last name of the doctor who first 
developed a vaccine against polio. 
11. Dormancy is the name of the long sleep that some 
animals go through during the entire winter. 
12. Ravel composed "Claire de lune". 
13. Thunder was the name of Roy Roger's dog. 
14. The pancreas is the name of the organ that produces 
insulin. 
15. The island of Sardinia is located in the Mediterranean 
sea. 
16. Rockwell is the last name of the artist who painted 
"American Gothic". 
17. Migraine is the name of the severe headache that 
returns periodically and often is accompanied by nausea. 
18. The French Revolution began in 1730. 
19. Orion is the name of the north star. 
20. Hockey is the sport in which the Stanley Cup is 
awarded. 
21. C6Hl206 is the chemical formula for dextrose (grape 
sugar). 
22. A javelin is the name of the spear-like object that is 
thrown during a track meet. 
23. Shakespeare is the last name of the man who wrote 
"Canterbury Tales••. 
24. Picasso painted ••The Three Musicians". 
25. Dillenger is the last name of the criminal who was 
killed by FBI agents outside of a Chicago movie theater. 
26. The first air raid occurred in 1849. 
27. The Magna Charta was signed in 1320. 
28. The visual area of the brain is located in the temporal 
lobe. 
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29. Nightengale is the last name of the woman who founded 
the American Red Cross. 
30. Descarte wrote the Dioptrice. 
31. Backus is the last name of the man who was the voice 
of Mr. Magoo • 
32. A sextant is the name of the navigation instrument 
used at sea to plot position relative to the magnetic North 
Pole. 
33. Anthony is the last name of Flash's girlfriend in the 
comic strip "Flash Gordon". 
34. In addition to the Kentucky Derby and the Belmont 
Stakes, the Preakness is the horse race that completes the 
triple crown. 
35. Bush is the last name of the vice-president under the 
Reagan administration. 
36. Gagarin is the last name of the cosmonaut who was the 
first person to orbit around the earth. 
37. Granger was the last name of Billy the Kid. 
38. A meteor is the name for the astronomical bodies that 
enter the earth's atmosphere. 
39. Schultz is the last name of the man who created the 
comic str~p "Li '1 Abner"'. 
40. The name of von Frisch is usually associated with the 
biological studies of bees. 
41. Madison is the last name of the 4th u.s. president. 
42. The drachma is the monetary unit in the country of Egypt. 
43. Three fourths of the world's cacao comes from South 
America. 
44. Angora is the breed of cat that has blue eyes. 
45. Gantry is the last name of the football player known 
as "The Galloping Ghost"'. 
46. Garland is the last name of the singer who made a hit 
recording of the song "'Who's Sorry Now?". 
47. Polo is the sport in which a rider on horseback hits a 
ball with his mallet. 
48. Nebula is the name of the brightest star in the sky 
exclusing the sun. 
49. Occur is the name of the substance derived from a 
whale that is used to make perfume. 
50. A balk fs the name of an illegal move by a baseball 
pitcher that results in all runners advancing one base. 
51. Stone is the last name of the author of "The Agony and 
the Ecstasy". 
52. Silver is the metal associated with a 50th wedding 
anniversary. 
53. Mertz was the last name of Lucy's neighbors on the 
television show "I Love Lucy". 
54. The Rhine is the name of the river that runs through 
Rome. 
55. Communism is the most famous work written by Karl 
Marx. 
56. Virgil wrote the "Aeneid". 
57. Venezuela is the country in which Angel Falls is 
located. 
58. Erhart is the last name of the first person to 
complete a solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean. 
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59. Carnegy is the last name of the man who invented the 
phonograph • 
60. Bannister is the last name of the first man to run the 
mile ~n under four minutes. 
61. Red is the color name given to a light of 650 milli-
microns. 
62. Corbett is the last name of the boxer who won the 
boxing title from John L. Sullivan. 
63. Wings is the name of the first movie to receive the 
academy award for best picture. 
64. Arthur is the last name of the twenty-first u.s. 
president. 
65. The technical name for the collar bone is the scapular. 
66. Eagle was the name of the Apollo lunar module that 
landed the first man on the moon. 
67. An odometer is the name of the instument used to 
measure w~ndspeed. 
68. Potatoes are native to Ireland. 
69. Sydney is the capitol of Austraila. 
70. Dickens is the last name of the author who wrote 
"Oliver Twist". 
71. Ford is the last name of 
Jesse James. 
the man who supposedly killed 
72. Mozart is the last name of the composer who wrote "Don 
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85. Syria borders the Mediterranean sea. 
86. Jason was the leader of the Argonauts. 
87. The Yangtze is the longest river in Asia. 
88. West is the last name of Batman's secret identity in 
the Batman comics. 
89. Cody was the last name of Buffalo Bill. 
90. Powers is the last name of the pilot of the U-2 spy 
plane shot down over Russia in 1960. 
91. Pluto was the last planet to be discovered. 
92. Kahlil Gibran was most inspired by the Buddhist 
religion. 
93. Floyd is the last name of the criminal who was known 
as "Scarface". 
94. Ruby is the last name of the man who assasinated 
President John F. Kennedy. 
95. Fleming is the last name of the author of the James 
Bond novels. 
96. The Dod~ers won the 1959 World Series. 
97. An ohm ~s the unit of electrical power that refers to 
a current of one ampere at one volt. 
98. Grant is the last name of the union general who 
defeated the confederate army at the Civil War battle of 
Gettysburg. 
99. Wells is the last name of the author of "The War of 
the Worlds". 
100. Yahtze is the game which uses a doubling cube. 
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Answer Key to the General Information Statements {T=True, 
F=False): 
1. T 51. T 
2. T 52. F 
3. F 53. T 
4. T 54. F 
5. F 55. F 
6. T 56. T 
7. F 57. T 
8. F 58. F 
9. F 59. F 
10. T 60. T 
11. F 61. T 
12. F . 62. T 
13. F 63. T 
14. T 64. T 
15. T 65. F 
16. F 66. T 
17. T 67. F 
18. F 68. F 
19. F 69. F 
20. T 70. T 
21. T 71. T 
22. T 72. T 
23. F 73. F 
24. T 74. F 
25. T 75. F 
26. T 76. F 
27. F 77. F 
28. F 78. T 
29. F 79. T 
30. F 80. F 
31. T 81. T 
32. F 82. F 
33. F 83. F 
34. T 84. T 
35. T 85. T 
36. T 86. T 
37. F 87. T 
38. T 88. F 
39. F 89. T 
40. T 90. T 
41. T 91. T 
42. F 92. F 
43. F 93. F 
44. F 94. F 
45. F 95. T 
46. F 96. T 
47. T 97. F 
48. F 98. F 
49. F 99. T 
50. T 100. F 
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Questions-Only Instructions 
"In this study I am interested in what people "know about 
what they know". For instance, if I asked you a question 
and you gave me an answer, how sure are you that your 
answer is correct. we•11 go through two examples: If I 
gave you the statement 11 The planet Mars is three light 
years from the Earth •• and asked you whether it was true or 
false, you might say 11 if I have to give you an answer, I 1 ll 
say its true, but 1 really have no idea whether the 
statement is true or false, so 1 would be taking a guess ... 
However, if I gave you the statement 11 Mayor Byrne is the 
present mayor of Chicago .. * you would probably tell me that 
the statement is true, and that in fact you are absolutely 
sure that your response is correct. You are positive that 
Mayor Byrne is the mayor of Chicago. So, when responding 
to statements as true or false, sometimes you have no idea 
whether your response is correct or not, sometimes you may 
be a little sure or fairly sure that your response is 
correct, and sometimes you may be positive that you know 
you have given the correct response. 
I am going to give you a stack of cards and an answer 
sheet. On each card is a general information statement, 
with one word, name or date underlined. I want you to 
treat each statement as though it were a fill-in-the-blank 
question, where the blanks have already been filled in. 
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I 
want you to decide two things for each statement. First of 
all, do you think the blank has been filled in correctly, 
or has it been filled in incorrectly? If you think it is 
correct, circle true. If you think it is wrong, circle 
false. Secondly, and most importantly, I want you to rate 
how sure you are that your decision is correct in terms of 
the scale, from 0 to 5, on the answer sheet. It is not 
important how many of your decisions are correct, but it is 
important that you be as accurate as you can in rating 
whether your decision is correct or not. If you really 
have no idea about whether or not a statement has been 
filled in correctlyr you would just be taking a guess when 
making your decision, so you would probably want to circle 
0, which would indicate that you really have no idea 
whether your true/false response is correct or not. If you 
are somewhat sure that your decision is correct, you may 
want to circle a 1 or 2. If you are fairly sure that your 
decision is correct, you may want to circle a 3 or 4. If 
you have no doubt that your decision is correct, you are 
sure it is correct, then you may want to circle a 5. Only 
circle a 5 when you are absolutely sure that your decision 
is correct. Make sure that you give a decision and circle 
a rating for all 100 statements. I do not expect that you 
will know the information in all the statements, but about 
half of the information in the statements will probably be 
110 
familiar to you. It is not important how many of your 
responses are correct, but it is important that you be as 
accurate as you can be in your ratings. When you are done, 
you can take a 5 minute break and then we will begin the 
next part. 
Second part 
I want to give you some feedback about your ratings. The 
easiest way for me to tell how accurate you have been in 
rating the correctness of your responses is to correct your 
answers, and then, for each incorrect response you made, 
add up the number of points that you gave that response, in 
terms of how sure you were that it was correct. If you 
were very accurate in your ratings, the total rating score 
for all your incorrect responses should be low, indicating 
that you were not sure that these answers were correct. 
Your total score was It is ,of course, difficult to 
tell what this number may mean about your performance, 
since you are not able to compare it to a number indicating 
average subject performance. However, in a general way, 
this number indicates that sometimes, when you thought an 
answer was correct1 and gave it a high rating, it turned 
out to be incorrect. Please respond to and rate the 
questions again. Do not worry about what your responses 
were on the first trial. Try to approach the questions as 
if you were answering them for the first time. Also, try 
to be as accurate as you can in your confidence ratings for 
. . . 111 your responses, since th~s ~s the most ~mportant part of 
your response. '' (Note: The feedback given to this group 
is purposely ambiguous. The number given to them, though 
an accurate measure of their total ratings for wrong 
answers, has very little meaning, since they are given no 
comparison values. The explanation given of the number 
they received is the important feedback. They are told 
that sometimes when they thought an answer was correct, it 
was not correct. Therefore they are given simple, brief 
feedback that they have been overconfident in some of their 
ratings.} 
Monetary Incentive Instructions 
In this study I am interested in what people "know about 
what they know ... Por instance, if I asked you a question 
and you gave me an answer, how sure are you that your 
answer is correct. We'll go through two examples: If I 
gave you the statement "The planet Mars is three light 
years from the Earth" and asked you whether it was true or 
false, you might say "If I have to give you an answer, I'll 
say its true, but I really have no idea whether the 
statement is true or false,so I would be taking a guess". 
However, if I gave you the statement "Mayor Byrne is the 
present mayor of Chicago" you would probably tell me that 
the statement is true. and that in fact you are absolutely 
sure that your response is correct. You are positive that 
r~Iayor Byrne is the mayor of Chicago. So, when responding to 
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statements as true or false, sometimes you have no idea 
whether your response is correct or not, sometimes you may 
be a little sure or fairly sure that your response is 
correct, and sometimes you may be positive that you know 
you have given the correct response. 
I am going to give you a stack of cards and an answer 
sheet. On each card is a general information statement, 
with one word, name or date underlined. I want you to 
treat each statement as though it were a fill-in-the-blank 
question, where the blanks have already been filled in. I 
want you to decide two things for each statement. First of 
all, do you think the blank has been filled in correctly, 
or has it been filled in incorrectly? If you think it is 
correct, circle true. If you think it is wrong, circle 
false. Secondly, and most importantly, I want you to rate 
how sure you are that your decision is correct. I want 
you to do this in terms of the amount of money (in pennies) 
that you would be willing to bet that your decision is 
correct. It is not important how many of your decisions 
are correct, but it is important that you be as accurate as 
you can in rating whether your decision is correct or not. 
This jar contains the maximum amount of pennies that you 
could win if all of your ratings, and therefore all of your 
bets are accurate. You also cannot lose more than this 
amount of money, so this does not at all involve having you 
use any of your own money. Think about placing your bets 
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using the following procedure: imagine that the numbers 
from e to 5 by each of your decisions represents the number 
of pennies that you want to bet that your decision is 
correct. If you really have no idea about whether a 
statement has been filled in correctly or not, you would 
just be taking a guess when making your decisions, so you 
might not want to place any money on the probability that 
your decision is correct, and therefore you might want to 
circle e pennies. If you are somewhat sure that your 
decision is correct you may want to bet 1 or 2 pennies on 
the correctness of your decision. If you are fairly sure 
that your decision is correct, then you may want to bet 3 
or 4 cents. If you have no doubt that your decision is 
correct, you are sure it is correct, then you may want to 
bet 5 cents. Only bet 5 cents when you are absolutely sure 
that your decision is correct. Make sure that you give a 
decision and circle the amount of pennies you want to place 
on the correctness of that decision for all 1ee statements. 
We do not expect that you will know the information in all 
the statements, but about half of the information in the 
statements will probably be familiar to you. It is not 
important how many of your decisions are correct, but it is 
important that you be as accurate as you can be in your 
ratings. When you are done, you can take a 5 minute break 
and then we will begin the next part. 
Second part 
I want to give you some feedback about your rating bets. 114 
The easiest way for me to tell how accurate you have been 
in rating the correctness of your response is to correct 
your answers, and then, for each incorrect response you 
made, add up the number of pennies that you bet on that 
response, in terms of how sure you were that it was 
correct. That is the number of pennies that you have lost. 
If you were very accurate in your bets, then the total 
number of pennies that you would have bet for all your 
incorrect responses should be low, indicating that you were 
not sure that these answers were correct. The total number 
of pennies you have lost is It is difficult to tell 
exactly what this number means, since you don't know how 
much money you have won for your bets on your correct 
answers. However, this indicates that sometimes when you 
thought an answer was correct, and placed a higher number 
of pennies on it. for your bet, it turned out to be 
incorrect, and you lost those pennies. Please answer and 
place bets on the questions again, and try to be as 
accurate as you can be with your bets. If you are more 
accurate in your rating bets this time, you can win back 
some or all of the money that you lost, since I will give 
you money from the trial you are most accurate on. Don't 
worry about the responses you gave last time. Try to 
approach the questions as though you are responding to them 
for the first time, and remember that it is important that 
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you be as acccurate as you can be with your bets.( In 
actuality, due to limited funds,subjects were offered a 
maximum of $2 after the entire experiment was over, no 
matter how high their actual winnings were. Approximately 
1/2 of the subjects of both age groups took their winnings, 
the others said they had enjoyed the study, and did not 
want to take their winnings, even though money won was 
offered to each of these subjects several times). 
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Subject Selection 
Two forms of the general information questionnaire 
were originally planned to be administered to subjects; an 
"easy" form and a more "difficult" form. The difference 
between the two questionnaires was that every third 
question from questions 1 to 90 was an "easy" question on 
form A (selected so that it was answered correctly over 75% 
of the time on pilot studies) or a "difficult" question on 
form B (selected so that it was answered correctly less 
than 50% of the time in pilot studies). The criterion for 
deciding which form to administer to each subject was the 
subject's score on the Quick Test. As stated earlier, 
subjects scoring 43 or above on the QT were given a form B, 
and subjects scoring less than 43 received form A. 
However, after testing many of the older subjects, it 
was found that very few of the subjects who agreed to 
participate received less than a score of 43. Since it was 
difficult to recruit older subjects, form A was discarded 
from further analyses, and only those subjects who scored a 
43 or above on the QT were included in the final analyses. 
The subject groups included in the following analyses 
were matched for proportion of answers correct on the 
questionnaire to ensure that proportion correct would not 
be a factor. In order to match subjects as closely as 
possible, 5 young subjects that otherwise met the criterion 
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for being included in the study were dropped because they 
could not be matched with subjects in the comparison group 
{4 in the young no money condition, 1 in the money 
condition). In addition, of the 17 young subjects used in 
each condition, 14 of these subjects were compared to the 
14 older subjects in each condition. The best match 
comparing older subjects from Trial 1 to 2 was to drop 2 
subjects each in the money and no money conditions. 
Preliminary analysis of subject data before matching 
is shown on calibration curves in Figures lD and 2D. The 
data pattern between these unmatched subject comparisons 
and the matched comparisons shown in the results section 
{Figures 1 -12) is similar, but since differences in 
proportion correct are known to have some influence on 
calibration {Lichtenstein, et al., 1982}, all the following 
analyses are done on matched subjects. 
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